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Abstract
For almost a decade, the United States has deployed unmanned aerial vehicles, or "drones," to kill targeted
members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes in Pakistan have, in
particular, stirred strong debates over the legality of such actions. Some commentators insist that these strikes
are legal under international humanitarian law (IHL) or as a matter of self-defense. Others insist that the
United States' targeted killing amounts to murder.
It is critical for the law to determine how to control killer drones and the future of warfare. As technology
evolves, drones will develop sharper senses and become more precise and lethal. The power to use drones to
find and kill specific human targets-and states' temptation to use (and abuse) that power- will grow over time.
On other fronts, drones may become fully automated, and their use in surveillance may spread along the
borders with Canada and Mexico and into the U.S. heartland.
To rein in the killer drones, this Article looks to foundational IHL principles to develop limits on the CIA's
campaign in Pakistan and on the possible extension of that campaign to other countries outside the United
States. In particular, this Article argues that IHL's requirements of distinction and military necessity generally
require the CIA to achieve a very high level of certainty that a targeted person is a legitimate object of attack
before carrying out a drone strike. To capture this level of certainty, one might borrow the "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard from the criminal law, the "clear and convincing" standard from civil law, or create some new
phrase. Also, to honor the principle of precaution, the CIA's Inspector General must review every CIA drone
strike, including the agency's compliance with a checklist of standards and procedures for the drone program.
The results of these reviews should be made as public as consonant with national security. These controls are,
in the language of IHL, "feasible precautions" for the remote-control weapons of the new century. The Article
closes by considering whether targeting of U.S. citizens by the U.S. government should be subject to stricter
due process controls than targeting of non-Americans-a point that also has stirred controversy.
The Article concludes that, if the controls on targeted killing are not good enough for U.S. targets, they are not
good enough for Pakistanis, Yemenis, Somalis, and others. The law can develop a set of standards to ensure
that states use targeted killing, whether as part of an armed conflict or in self-defense, only against legitimate
targets- no matter their citizenship.
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For almost a decade, the United States has deployed unmanned
aerial vehicles, or "drones," to kill targeted members of Al Qaeda and
the Taliban. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes in Paki-
stan have, in particular, stirred strong debates over the legality of such
actions. Some commentators insist that these strikes are legal under
international humanitarian law (IHL) or as a matter of self-defense.
Others insist that the United States' targeted killing amounts to mur-
der.
It is critical for the law to determine how to control killer drones
and the future of warfare. As technology evolves, drones will develop
sharper senses and become more precise and lethal. The power to use
drones to find and kill specific human targets-and states' temptation
to use (and abuse) that power- will grow over time. On other fronts,
drones may become fully automated, and their use in surveillance
may spread along the borders with Canada and Mexico and into the
U.S. heartland.
To rein in the killer drones, this Article looks to foundational
IHL principles to develop limits on the CIA's campaign in Pakistan
and on the possible extension of that campaign to other countries out-
side the United States. In particular, this Article argues that IHL's re-
quirements of distinction and military necessity generally require the
CIA to achieve a very high level of certainty that a targeted person is a
legitimate object of attack before carrying out a drone strike. To cap-
ture this level of certainty, one might borrow the "beyond reasonable
doubt" standard from the criminal law, the "clear and convincing"
standard from civil law, or create some new phrase. Also, to honor
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the principle of precaution, the CIA's Inspector General must review
every CIA drone strike, including the agency's compliance with a
checklist of standards and procedures for the drone program. The re-
sults of these reviews should be made as public as consonant with na-
tional security. These controls are, in the language of IHL, "feasible
precautions" for the remote-control weapons of the new century.
The Article closes by considering whether targeting of U.S. citi-
zens by the U.S. government should be subject to stricter due process
controls than targeting of non-Americans-a point that also has
stirred controversy. The Article concludes that, if the controls on tar-
geted killing are not good enough for U.S. targets, they are not good
enough for Pakistanis, Yemenis, Somalis, and others. The law can
develop a set of standards to ensure that states use targeted killing,
whether as part of an armed conflict or in self-defense, only against
legitimate targets- no matter their citizenship.
I. INTRODUCTION
[CIA] sharpshooters killed eight people suspected of being militants
of the Taliban and Al Qaeda ... in a compound that was said to be
used for terrorist training. Then, the job in North Waziristan done,
the C.I.A. officers could head home from the agency's Langley, Va.,
headquarters, facing only the hazards of the area's famously snarled
suburban traffic.'
The CIA officers of the preceding media account fired missiles from
the belly of a remote-controlled drone to kill suspected militants.2 The
use of drones to target and kill leaders of Al Qaeda and the Taliban (col-
lectively, AQ/T) began under the Bush administration.' The Air Force
has controlled these operations in the clear war zones of Afghanistan and
Iraq.4 Elsewhere, in northwest Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the CIA
controls operations.' The number of CIA drone strikes has soared since
the Obama administration took office, making targeted killing a key to
the administration's counterterrorism efforts.' The Obama administra-
1. Scott Shane, C.I.A. Drone Use Is Set to Expand Inside Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2009
(Late Edition), at Al.
2. Id.
3. Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2008 (Late Edition), at Al (reporting that, by 2008, the CIA Predator campaign in
Pakistan had been proceeding for several years).
4. Christopher Drew, For U.S., Drones Are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17,2009 (Late Edition), at Al.
5. Peter Baker, Stopping the Next One: Obama's War over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010
(Magazine), at 30, 39 (reporting that President Obama authorized doubling the number of drones in
the Pakistan border area as well as increased use over Yemen and Somalia); Jane Mayer, The Predator
War: What Are the Risks of the C.IA.'s Covert Drone Program?, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26,2009, at 36,37
("The C.I.A.'s program is aimed at terror suspects around the world, including in countries where U.S.
troops are not based.").
6. See Drew, supra note 4 (reporting several dozen CIA Predator attacks preceding March
2010); see also Christopher Drew, For Spying and Attacks, Drones Play a Growing Role in Afghanis-
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tion, signaling its resolve, has gone so far as to add a U.S. citizen residing
in Yemen to the hit list.7
Drones represent a summit in long-distance killing. From the Neo-
lithic spear, to the bow and arrow, to artillery, to the airplane, to the
cruise missile, advances in weaponry over the millennia have made it eas-
ier and safer to kill from great distances. Drones, combined with suitable
missiles, have taken this process to its logical extreme.
Drones also represent a profound leap in intelligence gathering. A
small drone-unburdened by a pilot who must protect himself from
enemy fire-can hover unseen above a potential target for many hours.8
The drone's powerful cameras gather ground information that is instant-
ly beamed to the United States for assessment.9 Plus, infrared and other
sensors may add to the drone's capabilities.
The drone's capabilities will increase as military and intelligence
agencies invest more in this marvelous tool.10 Vision will become sharper
as cameras grow stronger,' and missiles will become more accurate and
smaller. The endpoint may be the nano-drone that sniffs out the head of
Al Qaeda, buzzes into his bedroom, kills him in his sleep, and dissolves
into the Pakistani mist.12
tan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010 (Late Edition), at A6 (reporting the conclusion of independent re-
searchers that the CIA conducted sixty-nine drone attacks in Pakistan during 2009 and the beginning
of 2010).
7. Scott Shane, U.S. Approves Targeted Killing of Radical Muslim Cleric Tied to Domestic Ter-
ror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010 (Late Edition), at A12 (reporting that al-Awlaki, who resides in
Yemen, was approved for targeted killing because he was a recruiter for Al Qaeda plots in the Ara-
bian Peninsula).
8. See Mayer, supra note 5, at 36,44 (reporting forty-hour figure).
9. Id. at 36. For video of the drone's camera capabilities as of 2009-or as much as the Air
Force was willing to reveal on television, see America's New Air Force (CBS television broadcast May
10, 2009), available at http://www.cbsnews.comlvideo/watch/?id=5245555n&tag=mncol;lst;1 (showing,
at 5:43 mark, video footage captured by drone operating at 10,000 feet over the 60 Minutes crew on an
Air Force base runway; showing, at 6:25 mark, nighttime, infrared video of a person carrying a "hot
gun" just fired at U.S. forces and also showing missile strike on this person).
10. See Peter W. Singer, Attack of the Military Drones, BROOKINGS (June 27, 2009), http://www.
brookings.edulopinions/2009/0627_drones-singer.aspx.
One US Air Force general has predicted that conflicts in the near future will involve "tens of
thousands" of robots-and not the robots of today. The current Packbots and Predators are just
the first generation of battlefield robots; they are like the Model T Ford or the Wright brothers'
Flyer when compared to the prototypes already under development.
Id.
11. See Christopher Drew, Drone Flights Leave Military Awash in Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2010 (Late Edition), at Al ("Reaper drones, which are newer and larger than the Predators, will soon
be able to record video in 10 directions at once. By 2011, that will increase to 30 directions with plans
for as many as 65 after that.").
12. Cf. Christopher Drew, Air Force Report Envisions a Broader Use of Drones, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2009 (Late Edition), at B3 (reporting that the Air Force plans to develop "drone swarms" to
attack enemy targets); David Hambling, Air Force Completes Killer Micro-Drone Project, WIRED (Jan.
5, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/killer-micro-drone ("[M]ilitary budget
documents note that Air Force engineers were successful in 'develop[ing] a Micro-Air Vehicle (MAV)
with innovative seeker/tracking sensor algorithms that can engage maneuvering high-value targets."');
see also John Markoff, Ay Robot! Scientists Worry Machines May Outsmart Man, N.Y.TIMES, July 26,
2009 (Late Edition), at Al (listing self-recharging robots, unstoppable computer viruses, and auto-
nomous drones as things to worry about as machines get smarter than we are); Droning On: How to
1203
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
Killer drones are the future of warfare. Viewed from one angle, this
development has few legal implications insofar as drones merely provide
another tool for the longstanding military practice of killing enemies
from the air. But the drone's extraordinary capabilities have greatly ex-
panded the government's range for finding, tracking, and killing human
targets." Given the drone's ever-increasing power, it is inevitable that
they will be used in ways that challenge traditional legal paradigms; tar-
geted killing, whether conducted by the CIA or anyone else, has become
controversial. Proponents contend it is legal to kill identified enemies in
self-defense or as part of an armed conflict under the laws of war-
otherwise known as international humanitarian law (IHL). Critics decry
targeted killing as extrajudicial assassination.
A growing literature examines the legal issues presented by targeted
killing-whether by drone or other means. 14 One issue underlying much
Build Ethical Understanding into Pilotless War Planes, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 3, 2010, at 82 (discussing
proposal to use advanced software to endow drones with a "conscience" of sorts to minimize collateral
damage).
13. See Philip Alston, United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Study on Targeted Killings, 80, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/14/12/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) ("[Blecause [drones] make it easier to kill without risk to a
State's forces, policy makers and commanders will be tempted to interpret the legal limitations on who
can be killed, and under what circumstances, too expansively.").
14. For an important judicial discussion of targeted killing of terrorists, see the Israeli Supreme
Court's opinion in HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. (PCATI) [Dec. 11,
2005], slip op. para. 2, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/FilesENG/02/690/007/a34/02007690.
a34.pdf (concluding that an Israeli campaign of targeted killing could be conducted legally if subject to
identified procedural and substantive controls). For a recent and magisterial survey of targeted killing
under the laws of war authored by the Legal Adviser for the International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC), see generally NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 442-44
(2008).
For other recent commentary on targeted killing, see, for example, Kenneth Anderson, Tar-
geted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN
AGENDA FOR REFORM 346, 370 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009) (contending that the United States has,
and should vigorously assert, a right to self-defense that authorizes targeted killing of terrorists and
that does not depend on the existence of an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL); William C.
Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S. Legal Framework, 37 U.
RICH. L. REV. 667, 749 (2003) (concluding that the current U.S. legal framework "leave[s] the nasty
business of targeted killing where it should lie, as a permissible but tightly managed and fully account-
able weapon of national self-defense in an era of horrific terrorist attacks on the United States and its
people"); Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, "We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law": A
Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 233, 289 (2003) (con-
tending that, in armed conflicts, human rights law should control where IHL fails to provide clear
guidance); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki As a Case Study in the Internation-
al Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. (forthcoming 2011) (assessing the le-
gality of the United States' targeting of al-Awlaki, a dual Yemeni-American citizen, under the United
Nations Charter, IHL, and international human rights law); Kristen E. Eichensehr, Comment, On
Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the Expansion of Targeted Killings, 116 YALE L.J. 1873, 1878-
79 (2007) (contending that the Israeli decision in the PCA TI case adopted standards that improperly
allow civilian deaths); W. Jason Fisher, Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 733-34, 741-42 (2007) (contending that, given technological, political, and social
developments, a legal norm permitting targeted killing in contexts such as the war on terror will
evolve); Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing As Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 319, 334
(2004) (concluding, based on Israeli experience, that "targeted killing is a legitimate and effective form
of active self-defense"); David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Ex-
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of the debate is whether IHL can apply to a conflict between a state and
a terrorist group (e.g., to the conflict between the United States and Al
Qaeda). This determination is critical because states have broader au-
thority to kill under IHL than under human rights law that generally con-
trols outside armed conflicts.
To lay a foundation, this Article first explains why it is reasonable to
conclude that IHL can apply to targeted killing of hardened members of
terrorist groups. The Obama administration shares this conclusion
wholeheartedly." It is possible that years from now a consensus of com-
mentators, perhaps backed up by some court claiming universal jurisdic-
tion, will brand President Obama a war criminal because of drone
strikes.16 This outcome seems unlikely on the face of the matter (al-
though lower-level officials, unprotected by head-of-state status, may
face greater risks). If no combination of political and legal forces stops
states (including the United States) from targeted killing of suspected
terrorists, states will continue this practice. Over time, a consensus will
likely evolve that targeted killing of suspected terrorists under some cir-
cumstances is legal under IHL.1"
ecutions or Legitimate Means of Defense?, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171, 171, 202-03 (2005) (concluding that
targeted killing of terrorists can be legal under the laws of war, but that these laws should incorporate
elements of international human rights law to provide greater protection against improper targeting);
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31
CARDOZo L. REV. 405, 437 (2009) (suggesting a due process framework for limiting use of killer
drones); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt
ed., forthcoming 2011) (concluding that drone attacks coiducted by CIA officials in Pakistan without
that government's express permission are illegal); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-
State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237,
279-80 (2010) (concluding that targeted killings of nonstate actors directly involved in armed attacks
can be permissible as part of a "lawful self-defense response"); Tom Ruys, License to Kill? State-
Sponsored Assassination Under International Law, 44 MIL. LAW & L. WAR REV. 13, 29-30, 39 (2005)
(conceding that IHL permits targeted killing of combatants and civilians taking direct part in hostilities
but insisting on a narrow interpretation of "direct participation"); Gary Solis, Targeted Killing and the
Law of Armed Conflict, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Spring 2007, at 127, 134-36 (concluding that targeted
killing can be legal under IHL subject to conditions including: (1) the target is a civilian directly partic-
ipating in hostilities, and (2) (the attack was authorized by a senior military commander); AMNESTY
INT'L, Al INDEX MDE 15/056/2003, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ISRAEL MUST END ITS
POLICY OF ASSASSINATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE15/
056/2003 (follow "PDF" hyperlink) (condemning Israeli policy of targeted killing as an illegal scheme
of "extrajudicial executions").
15. See Press Release, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, U.S. State Dept. Legal Adviser Lays out Obama
Administration Position on Engagement, "Law of 9/11" (Mar. 25, 2010), http:www.asil.org/pdfs/
pressreleases/pr100325.pdf (supplying a partial transcript of public remarks of Harold H. Koh, State
Department Legal Adviser, who stated that, as part of its armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the United
States "has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force,
including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level [All Qaeda
leaders who are planning attacks").
16. See Shane Harris, Are Drone Strikes Murder?, NAT'L J., Jan. 9, 2010, at 24 (discussing the
possibility that "CIA employees or others involved in Predator strikes could conceivably face legal
scrutiny and prosecution" by, inter alia, the International Criminal Court).
17. For predictions that international law will allow targeted killing under limited circumstances,
see MELZER, supra note 14, at 9 ("Today, targeted killing is in the process of escaping the shadowy
realm of half-legality and non-accountability, and of gradually gaining legitimacy as a method of coun-
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If this is the likely evolution of the law, it is all the more important
to determine how IHL, assuming it applies, should regulate targeted kill-
ing. To provide a factual context for this determination, this Article fo-
cuses on CIA drone strikes in northwest Pakistan." Our analysis may, in
turn, be used for targeted killing by other means, by other agencies, and
in other places.
This Article notes, but does not focus on, the implications of having
a civilian agency involved in a lethal program. Some might insist that the
Defense Department be given an exclusive role in U.S. targeted killing.
Professor O'Connell, for instance, says the CIA drone campaign is illegal
in part because CIA officers cannot operate as "lawful combatants" in an
armed conflict: they are not part of a military chain of command, do not
wear uniforms, and are not trained in the laws of war." But the CIA
must take for granted that its operatives captured by AQ/T will not re-
ceive Prisoner of War (POW) status or other benefits of lawful bellig-
erency. Independent of such concerns, CIA officials must carry out
drone strikes consistent with IHL.
Several principles of IHL should play a major role in targeted kill-
ing. (Similar principles would also apply if the legal justification for a
drone strike is self-defense separate from an armed conflict.) First, IHL
requires distinction, separating combatants from civilians and precluding
the targeting of peaceful civilians.20 Second, IHL insists that military ne-
cessity justify all attacks: an attack should reasonably be expected to
create a concrete and direct military advantage. 21 Third, IHL requires
proportionality: attacks must not cause excessive "collateral damage."2
To give effect to these principles, IHL also speaks of precaution, which
ter-terrorism and 'surgical' warfare."). See also Fisher, supra note 14 (contending that technological
changes and the nature of counter-terrorism are contributing to the legitimacy of targeted killing). But
cf Anderson, supra note 14, at 21, 37 (contending that the United States should publicly insist that it
has the right to engage in targeted killing as self-defense in order to prevent development of a "soft
law" consensus that targeted killings outside of armed conflicts are criminal).
18. To use the traditional nomenclature, this Article focuses on the drone campaign's jus in bello
(principles governing how military force may be used) rather than on jus ad bellum (principles govern-
ing resort to force). This Article therefore does not consider issues such as whether the CIA drone
campaign violates IHL because the Pakistani government has not given sufficiently express consent.
Cf. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 18-19 (contending that, because the Pakistani government has not
given express consent to the CIA's drone strikes, it could claim the United States has acted unlawfully
and could seek compensation).
19. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 7. Note, however, that the CIA operates under the Command-
er-in-Chief, nothing stops drone operators from wearing uniforms, and nothing stops the CIA from
training its officers in the laws of war. Cf MELZER, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that in either in-
ternational or noninternational armed conflicts, police forces, intelligence agents, and border guards
may be regarded as "armed forces" of a state for the purpose of IHL even if they are not recognized as
such under domestic law). Moreover, the concept that "lawful combatants" are immune from prose-
cution under civil law for lawful acts of war does not apply in noninternational conflicts. MELZER,
supra note 14, at 323; see also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (explaining that the United
States' conflicts with Al Qaeda and the Taliban are noninternational in character).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 52-63.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 64-67.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 68-71.
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requires armed forces to take all feasible measures to minimize harm to
peaceful civilians and property.23
This Article makes two primary claims about how IHL's core prin-
ciples should apply to the CIA drone campaign. First, because of supe-
rior sources of intelligence and because the drone operator is not at risk
of attack by AQ/T, the CIA must, absent exceptional circumstances,
identify its targets with a very high level of certainty. For ease of refer-
ence, this Article will refer to the standard of certainty as "beyond rea-
sonable doubt." Some, however, might regard this standard as too
freighted with criminal law baggage to be transported to the IHL setting.
A person who takes this view might instead borrow from the civil law
and impose a "clear and convincing" standard of certainty. The particu-
lar phrase one uses is less important than the core idea of precaution. If
the CIA justifies its role in the drone campaign by saying that it is better
than the Defense Department at coordinating information and maintain-
ing secrecy, it should live up to those high expectations on targeting and
operations.
Second, to ensure compliance with a heightened standard of certain-
ty, all CIA targeted killings should receive an independent review that is
as public as national security permits.24 More specifically, "hard look"
review by the CIA's Inspector General at all of the agency's drone
strikes would help ensure that they occur only after careful, reasoned
consideration of all reasonably available and relevant information.
After advancing these two claims, this Article closes by briefly con-
sidering the implications of targeted killing of U.S. citizens by the U.S.
government. As noted, the Obama administration's placing of a U.S. cit-
izen on the list of targets has sparked controversy.2 6 This controversy is
misdirected. The problem with targeted killing is not that the U.S. gov-
ernment might kill a U.S. citizen who is demonstrably an enemy comba-
tant without first giving him or her a trial. The problem is that the U.S.
government - or any other government that uses drones - might fire mis-
siles inaccurately or without legal justification. The solution does not lie
in distinguishing the killing of Americans from less fortunate creatures.
The solution lies in developing careful standards and procedures that ap-
ply regardless of citizenship. These standards protect against mistakes
23. See infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
24. In an earlier piece, we contended that constitutional due process, understood in light of the
Supreme Court's major war on terror decisions, requires independent review of the legality of targeted
killings. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 445-50. In this Article, we put U.S. due process to
one side and show how this same duty of independent review can be derived directly from IHL prin-
ciples.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 169-73.
26. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Confirmed. Obama Authorizes Assassination of U.S. Citizen,
SALON (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:08 AM), http://www.salon.comlnews/opinion/glenn-greenwald/2010/04/07/ass
assinations (referencing the "extreme dangers and lawlessness of allowing the Executive Branch the
power to murder U.S. citizens far away from a battlefield.. .and with no due process of any kind" and
describing this practice as "Orwellian and tyrannical" (emphasis omitted)).
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resulting in unnecessary deaths while still respecting the government's
authority (and duty) to deal with terrorists that seek to commit mass
murder. The duties described-of certainty in targeting and independent
review-are necessary steps toward development of a due process for the
age of terror.
II. FOUNDATIONAL IHL
Analyzing the legality of targeted killing can be difficult because
this practice falls between the two dominant legal models that generally
are understood to control the state's use of force: human rights law and
IHL.27 Human rights law controls civil law enforcement, sharply limiting
state authority to kill-outside the full process of a trial-to situations
where the target poses an imminent risk of death or serious injury to
others. IHL, by contrast, controls killing in an armed conflict and
grants broad authority to kill opposing combatants (as well as civilians
directly taking part in hostilities). 29 These two models overlap when ap-
plied to targeting a person who is an imminent and direct threat. For in-
stance, either model would permit killing an Al Qaeda leader shooting
on a crowd of civilians at a soccer game. Human rights law would not,
however, permit targeting this person if he were unarmed and far away
from any armed hostilities. IHL likely would.30
27. The simple, two-model dichotomy between human rights law and IHL is under pressure
from two different directions. First, the dichotomy may be blurring as policing and war become more
like each other. See Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079, 1081 (2008); see also John T. Parry, Terrorism
and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 765, 767 (2007) ("[W]ar has changed in its
functions, to become more like policing, [and] that policing too has changed, to become more like
war.").
Second, and more to the present point, some scholars contend that the two models do not ex-
haust all the possibilities. Some contend that targeted killing can be legal as a matter of "self-defense"
even in the absence of an "armed conflict" in which there are fewer restrictions on killing. See Ander-
son, supra note 14, at 17-18; Paust, supra note 14, at 259. Others insist self-defense regulates only in-
terstate relations, and "that, even if justified under the law of interstate force, the international lawful-
ness of a particular targeted killing additionally depends on the law protecting individuals from
arbitrary deprivation of life, namely human rights law and, in the case of armed conflict, IHL."
MELZER,supra note 14, at 52.
For the most part, this Article avoids this debate about self-defense and does not dwell on the
policing/war dichotomy. We choose to explore how distinction, military necessity, and other IHL
principles limit targeted killing; these core principles apply even where targeted killing is characterized
as self-defense. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 14, at 268-69 (observing that self-defense must comply with
core IHL requirements including military necessity and proportionality).
28. See, e.g., MELZER, supra note 14, at 59 ("It is generally found that, under human rights law,
targeted killings are permitted only in the most extreme circumstances, such as to prevent a concrete
and immediate danger of death or serious physical injury.
29. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan: Transna-
tional Armed Conflict, Al Qaeda and the Limits of the Associated Militia Concept, 84 INT'L L. STUD.,
2009, at 181, 202 (observing that, whereas use of deadly force must be a measure of last resort during
law enforcement, "use of deadly force against a military objective is a legitimate measure of first resort
during armed conflict").
30. Cf supra note 27 (noting arguments that targeted killing may also be legal as a matter of self-
defense).
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IHL is a compilation of treaties, case law, and customary interna-
tional law that seeks to prevent unjustified death, destruction, and suffer-
ing in war." Ideas about limiting the horrors of war are as old as humani-
ty itself.32 The codification of IHL, however, began in earnest around the
turn of the nineteenth century with the Hague Conventions in 1899 and
1907, when world powers met to write down the laws and customs of
war.33
The Geneva Conventions adopted in 1949 form the modern bed-
rock of IHL.3 As their titles attest, all four conventions seek to protect
people who are not functioning as combatants, either because they have
withdrawn from the fight or because they are peaceful civilians who nev-
er took part in it." Prior to World War II, international treaties to pro-
tect civilians were not thought necessary because of the "cardinal prin-
ciple" that civilian populations should enjoy complete immunity from
armed conflict.36 After World War II proved this rule horribly wrong in
practice, the Fourth Geneva Convention aimed at protecting civilians
from attack "to the extent consistent with the economic and efficient use
of armed force."3  Today this aspiration is close to universal. According
to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), 194 countries
have signed the Geneva Conventions, making them applicable to armed
conflicts around the world.3 1
For IHL to apply, an "armed conflict," which is something more
than sporadic violence, must exist.39 Armed conflicts can be either "in-
ternational" or "noninternational." The former governs wars among na-
tion-states.4 0 The latter, a less developed category, was originally in-
31. See, e.g., WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?, ICRC 1 (July 2004), http://
www.icrc.org/eng/assests/files/other/what is_ihl.pdf ("[IHL is] a set of rules which seek, for humanitar-
ian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer par-
ticipating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.").
32. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 15 (2d ed. 2000)
(explaining views of war from the fourth century BCE and biblical times).
33. Id. at 17.
34. See ICRC, supra note 31, at 1 ("A major part of international humanitarian law is contained
in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Nearly every State in the world has agreed to be bound by
them.").
35. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135.
36. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY: IV GENEVA CONVENTION, RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN TIME OF WAR 3 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958).
37. GREEN, supra note 32, at 348.
38. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT'L ICRC, http://www.
icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp (last visited May 22,
2011).
39. MELZER, supra note 14, at 245.
40. See Dinah PoKempner, The "New" Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian Law, 38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 551, 554 (2006).
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tended to govern intrastate civil wars.41 Decades after adoption of the
four Geneva Conventions, most nations adopted Additional Protocols I
and II to increase protections. 42 Protocol I applies to international con-
flicts; Protocol II applies to noninternational conflicts.43  Given their
shared purpose of protecting victims of armed conflict, both protocols
are instructive on targeting. Although the United States has not ratified
these additional protocols," it regards almost all of Protocol II and much
of Protocol I as customary international law.45  It is also U.S. policy to
comply with both protocols whenever feasible. 46
The United States' conflict with Al Qaeda does not fit neatly into
either a framework for armed conflicts between nation-states on the one
hand ("international armed conflicts") or into a framework for intrastate
civil wars on the other hand ("noninternational armed conflicts"). 47 Ex-
ploiting this difficulty, the Bush administration concluded that the con-
flict with Al Qaeda fell into neither category and was therefore not sub-
ject to the Geneva Conventions." The Supreme Court eventually
blocked this move in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which held that the conflict
with Al Qaeda should be regarded as "noninternational" because the
conflict was not between states even though it spills over international
borders.49 By extension, the U.S. conflict with the Taliban should also be
regarded as noninternational since the Taliban no longer controls the
government of Afghanistan. 0
41. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Rec-
ognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 295, 308 (2007) (tracing the
view that the category of noninternational armed conflict was limited to intrastate civil wars).
42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-
inafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
43. See Protocol 1, supra note 42; Protocol II, supra note 42.
44. The United States has ratified all four Geneva Conventions, but has only signed, and not
ratified, Protocols I and II. See United Nations Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.
org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 (last visited May 22, 2011) (listing nations that
have ratified or signed Protocol I) [hereinafter United Nations Treaty Collection I]; United Nations
Treaty Collection, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000
2800f3cb8 (last visited May 22, 2011) (listing nations that have ratified or signed Protocol II) [hereinaf-
ter United Nations Treaty Collection II].
45. JEFF A. BOVARNICK ET AL., INT'L & OPERATIONAL L. DEP'T, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK 23
(Brian J. Bill ed., 2010), http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/deskbook.pdf.
46. See id.
47. For an argument that IHL should respond to this conceptual gap by recognizing a category
of "transnational armed conflicts" to which all basic law of war principles apply, see generally Corn,
supra note 41.
48. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006) (explaining the government's position that
the conflict with Al Qaeda was: (1) not an international conflict because Al Oaeda was not a nation
signatory to the Geneva Conventions, and (2) not a noninternational conflict because the conflict was
"international in scope").
49. Id. at 630.
50. See, e.g., Jelena Pejic, Terrorist Acts and Groups: A Role for International Law?, 75 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 71, 82 (2004) (explaining that the conflict between the United States and the Taliban
became an "internationalized" kind of "non-international armed conflict" after an Afghan govern-
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Whether the relevant conflict is international or noninternational,
the United States, in prosecuting a war with Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
must honor the IHL principles of distinction, military necessity, propor-
tionality, and precaution." Both types of armed conflict lead to the same
general conclusions.
The principle of distinction separates people and objects into two
categories: those legally subject to direct attack and those not. In the
context of international conflicts, Article 48 of Protocol I states:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian popula-
tion and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and be-
tween civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives."
Although parallel language does not appear in Protocol II, the principle
of distinction applies in noninternational conflicts as a matter of custom-
ary international law.13
During armed conflict, members of armed forces and civilians are
subject to quite different default rules. Armed forces may not directly
attack civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hos-
tilities."54 By contrast, members of "armed forces" or "armed groups"
are subject to direct attack provided they are not hors de combat or func-
tioning as medical or religious personnel."
The ICRC, elaborating on the concept of "armed forces," has con-
cluded that, as a matter of customary law:
The armed forces of a party to the conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups, and units that are under a command respon-
sible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates."
To qualify as an "armed group" subject to attack under this definition, a
rebel group need not attain the level of organization and hierarchical
control associated with state-controlled military forces. Rather, to quali-
fy, a fighting force need only be:
ment was established by loya jirga in June 2002); DEREK JINKS, INT'L HUMANITARIAN RESEARCH
INITIATIVE THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS 9 (JAN. 27-29, 2003), http://ihl.ihiresearch.org/-dataln_0002/resources/
live/Session3.pdf (observing that the conflict in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 was a noninternational con-
flict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, that the conflict became international after the
United States intervened, and that the conflict "may well have reverted" to noninternational status
after the Taliban lost control of the government).
51. See Corn, supra note 29, at 25, 42 (contending that, regardless of how an "armed conflict" is
pigeonholed, fundamental rules of the law of war should apply to it; these principles include military
necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality).
52. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 48.
53. See MELZER, supra note 14, at 311.
54. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 51(3).
55. MELZER,supra note 14, at 313.
56. Id. at 318 (quoting JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 14-17 (2005)(explaining and summarizing ICRC Rule 4)).
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capable, on the one hand, of planning and carrying out sustained
and concerted military operations, and on the other, of imposing
discipline in the name of a de facto authority. 7
These IHL principles suggest two possibilities for characterizing
AQ/T members as legitimate targets of direct attack. The first possibility
is to characterize them as civilians who directly participate in hostilities.
Critics of applying this direct-participation model to hardened terrorists
have noted, however, that it can create a revolving door that allows a
person to function as a baker by day and as a terrorist by night.18
One way to shut the revolving door is to adopt a very broad con-
struction of "direct participation," as the Israeli Supreme Court did in its
important discussion of targeted killing in The Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel v. The Government of Israel.59 According to the Court, a
civilian loses immunity from attack while "preparing" for hostilities,
planning a hostile act, or participating in a "chain of hostilities" as an ac-
tive member of a terrorist group.60 This interpretation would presumably
allow the United States to kill the head of Al Qaeda in his sleep because
he is participating in a "chain of hostilities." This interpretation, howev-
er, drains close to all meaning from "direct" participation.
A more straightforward and honest way of closing the revolving
door and justifying direct attacks on AQ/T is to characterize their har-
dened operatives as members of an "armed group."61 According to the
ICRC's recent Interpretive Guidance, a person becomes a member of an
"armed group" by adopting "a continuous function for the group involv-
ing his or her direct participation in hostilities." 62  Elaborating on this
theme, the ICRC explains:
Continuous combat function requires lasting integration into an or-
ganized armed group acting as the armed forces of a non-State par-
57. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977: Commentary, ICRC,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM475-760004 (last visited May 22, 2011).
58. See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 193 (observing that strict construction of "direct partici-
pation" in hostilities would allow terrorists to "enjoy the best of both worlds-they can remain ci-
vilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians while actually in the process of
carrying out a terrorist act").
59. PCATI at para. 40.
60. Id. at para. 33, 37, 39.
61. For discussion of this "membership" model for characterizing legitimate objects of direct
attack in noninternational conflicts, see especially Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
991 (2008), http://www.icrc.org/englassets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf. See also MEL-
ZER, supra note 14, at 327 ("[U]nder customary IHL applicable in non-international armed conflict,
functional 'combatancy' denotes the assumption by members of the armed forces of a State or non-
State party to the conflict of a continuous function involving his or her direct participation in hostilities
on a regular basis."); Kretzmer, supra note 14, at 198 ("The logical conclusion of the definition of a
non-international armed conflict as one between the armed forces of a state and an organized armed
group is that members of both the armed forces and the organized armed group are combatants.").
But see Eichensehr, supra note 14, at 1877 (criticizing the "membership-based model" for determining
when civilians may be directly targeted).
62. Melzer, supra note 61, at 1007.
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ty to an armed conflict. Thus, individuals whose continuous func-
tion involves the preparation, execution, or command of acts or op-
erations amounting to direct participation in hostilities are assuming
a continuous combat function. An individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in
hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous
combat function even before he or she first carries out a hostile
act.63
In choosing between the Israeli (direct participation) and the ICRC
(membership) models, one can place the conclusion before the analysis:
the U.S. government, if it gets a clean shot, should be able to kill the
head of Al Qaeda in his sleep. This is undoubtedly the official U.S. posi-
tion under the law. To justify targeting him as a "civilian," one must pre-
tend that, even while sleeping, he is "directly participating" in hostilities.
That stretches belief for many. By contrast, regarding Osama Bin Laden
or his replacement as a functional combatant as a result of his leadership
and his membership in an organized armed group is forthright and intui-
tive, leaving room for a narrower interpretation of "direct participation"
in other contexts. Plus, the ICRC's "lasting integration" requirement
prevents targeting persons with only casual connections to Al Qaeda and
other armed groups.
Neither the Israeli model nor the ICRC model grants carte blanche
to attack AQ/T members under any and all circumstances. To start,
whether the CIA or the Air Force is pulling the trigger on the drone, mil-
itary necessity requires a legitimate purpose. To be slightly more specific,
the U.S. Army Field Manual explains "'military necessity'... has been
defined as that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by
international law which are indispensable for securing the complete
submission of the enemy as soon as possible.""4 The Field Manual also
warns that, to protect both civilians and combatants from unnecessary
suffering, the laws of war prohibit "employing any kind or degree of vi-
olence which is not actually necessary for military purposes."65 This
stands true for both Predator strikes from the sky and for Special Forces
shots from the ground. Given the inherent uncertainties of armed con-
flict, a later review of whether military necessity was present must pro-
vide fair deference to a commander based on the limited information
available at the time of the attack."6 The Army Field Manual does, how-
ever, forbid violence where an attack could not reasonably be expected
63. Id.
64. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 4 para.
3 (1956), www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_.Law/pdf/law warfare_1956.pdf [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL].
65. Id.
66. See MELZER, supra note 14, at 296-97 (discussing tolerance for honest errors in judgment
regarding military necessity).
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to lead to any concrete military advantage at all.67 That is an extreme
and easy case.
All attacks must also satisfy the principle of proportionality. This
principle precludes any attack expected to cause excessive damage to
peaceful civilians and property in light of the "concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage" the attack is expected to create.6 This is the roughest
sort of cost-benefit analysis. Since there is no bright line to define "ex-
cessive," the inquiry is a crude balancing between the military goal and
the civilian costs.69 Even so, the principle of proportionality places some
targets off-limits because the costs of attack to surrounding civilians
would be too severe. An urban nuclear generator, for example, might
seem a valid target, but the resulting release of radiation and the ca-
tastrophic casualties would make a military attack disproportionate. 0 As
with military necessity, a later review of whether an attack was propor-
tional must leave room for commanders, in the heat of battle, to make
honest (and imperfect) assessments of the costs and benefits to an at-
tack.71
To ensure that the principles of distinction, military necessity, and
proportionality are implemented, IHL imposes an additional require-
ment of precaution: attackers must take all "feasible" steps to ensure that
attacks are directed at legitimate military targets and to minimize col-
lateral damage to peaceful civilians.72 The key and vague term here is
67. FIELD MANUAL, supra note 64, at app. A-1.
68. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 51(5)(b); FIELD MANUAL, supra note 64, at 19 para. 41
("[Lloss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained."); MELZER, supra note 14, at 46 (quot-
ing HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BEUK, supra note 56, at 46 ("Launching an attack which may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combi-
nation thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated, is prohibited.")).
69. PETER LANG, THE CONCEPTS OF PROPORTIONALITY AND STATE CRIMES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (Christian Wicker trans., 2006).
70. Cf Protocol 1, supra note 42, art. 56(1) ("Works or installations containing dangerous
forces ... [such as] nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even
where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.").
71. GREEN, supra note 32, at 351; see also MELZER, supra note 14, at 361 ("[Iln order for an at-
tack to become unlawful on grounds of proportionality, the excessiveness of the expected collateral
damage should be relatively obvious to the responsible military commander. Indeed, there seems to
be agreement that the determination to be made is necessarily a subjective one, albeit based on an
honest and diligent bona fide assessment in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time .....
72. In this regard, Article 57(2)(a) of Protocol I provides:
(a) Those who plan or decide upon an attack shall:
(i) Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civi-
lians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military objec-
tives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 52 and that it is not prohibited by the
provisions of this Protocol to attack them;
(ii) Take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a
view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects;
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"feasible." Commentators have put some gloss on this term that seems
almost as vague: feasible measures are those that are "practicable or
practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling at the
time, including humanitarian and military considerations." 3  At bottom,
precaution calls for the rule of reason.7 4
In sum for this Part, it is accepted that the United States is in a non-
international armed conflict with some AQ/T forces. For this reason, the
United States may kill the committed members of these groups who do
the fighting or plan the fighting. Depending on the circumstances, a wide
range of weapons can be used to kill suspected terrorists. Whatever the
weapon, the attack must honor the requirements of distinction, military
necessity, and proportionality. To fulfill these requirements, the United
States must also honor the overarching principle of precaution.
III. DRONES OVER PAKISTAN
Figuring out all the relevant facts bearing on the legality of the
CIA's targeted-killing-by-drone campaign is not possible because of gov-
ernmental secrecy, geographic inaccessibility, and the unreliability of re-
ports from the region. Indeed, the CIA, to repeat, will neither confirm
nor deny that it is involved in this campaign at all. Even so, enough in-
formation has leaked into the public record to give us something to begin
legal analysis. Again, we rely on the media to provide us with a version
of reality at the CIA.
The CIA's drone attacks in Pakistan began in 2004 with one strike.7 1
The next several years saw few attacks-one additional drone strike in
(iii) Refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause inci-
dental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advan-
tage anticipated.
Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 57(2)(a); see also FIELD MANUAL, supra note 64, at 5 para. 41 ("Those
who plan or decide upon an attack ... must take all reasonable steps to ensure not only that the objec-
tives are identified as military objectives or defended places within the meaning of the preceding para-
graph but also that these objectives may be attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to
property disproportionate to the military advantage anticipated.").
73. See MELZER, supra note 14, at 365 (contending that there is "general agreement" supporting
this "practicable or practically possible" gloss on feasibility).
74. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT'L
REv. RED CROSs 445, 461 (2005) ("[W]hat would a reasonable attacker do in the same or similar cir-
cumstances?").
75. The figures in this paragraph are taken from reports prepared by The Long War Journal and
the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank. See Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann,
The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010, NEW AM. FOUND.
(Feb. 24, 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergen
tiedemann2.pdf; Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Analysis: US Air Campaign in Pakistan Heats Up,
LONG WAR J. (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.longwarjoumal.orglarchives/2010/01/analysis us-air_
camp.php. In reaching its totals, The Long War Journal states that it relies upon "publicly available
data." Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, US Predator Strikes in Pakistan: Observations, LONG WAR J.
(July 21, 2009), http://www.longwarjoumal.orglarchives/2009/07/us-predator-strikes_3.php. The New
America Foundation states that its figures draw "only on accounts from reliable media organizations
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2005, three in 2006, and five in 2007. During 2008, the last year of the
Bush administration, drone strikes rose sharply to thirty-six. Next came
President Obama. Keeping his campaign promise to take the fight
against terrorists into Pakistan, drone strikes increased still more in 2009
to a total of fifty-three; in 2010, they soared to one hundred eighteen.
The Predator and Reaper drones come armed with missiles. Addi-
tionally, Reapers carry five hundred-pound guided bombs.76 Both types
of drones can stay in the air for dozens of hours at a time-all the while
beaming video, in real time, to analysts in the United States.77 CIA teams
in Afghanistan and Pakistan handle takeoffs and landings; after takeoff,
control flips to other CIA teams.78  Given the likely number of drones in
the air at any time, intelligence officers must be watching and assessing
thousands of hours of drone video per month. 79
Although drones are valuable tools, they cannot, by themselves,
provide the right kind of intelligence for determining whom to target.
Nor, given that northwest Pakistan is a big and rugged place, can a drone
find a premeditated target without other sources of intelligence. The
particular sources and methods that U.S. officials use are secret. Still, it
is logical to assume that the CIA is gathering intelligence through all
means at its disposal to support the drone program.
The means include both human and technical sources. Human
sources include both U.S. intelligence officers and liaison officers in the
region who pass along information from various sources they develop.
This information may include tips about the identities and future loca-
tions of AQ/T members. Those relying on the intelligence, of course, al-
ways face the problem of determining who and what is trustworthy. The
CIA's attempted recruitment of an Al Qaeda member who later killed
with deep reporting capabilities in Pakistan," which include, inter alia, the New York Times, Reuters,
BBC, leading Pakistani English language newspapers, and Geo TV, the largest independent Pakistani
television network. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 75, at 2.
The Long War Journal, in particular, has a pedigree that is not likely to engender trust among crit-
ics of Predator strikes. It is a publication of Public Multimedia, Inc., which draws extensive support
from the neoconservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies. See The Editors, LONG WAR J.,
http://www.longwaijoumal.org/staff.php (last visited May 22, 2011) (stating biographical information
for the staff of The Long War Journal and indicating close ties to the neoconservative Foundation for
Defense of Democracies). The New America Foundation is more difficult to pigeonhole; it draws its
board members from a cast of extremely prominent authors, politicians, and businesspersons-for
example, Fareed Zakaria, James Fallows, and Eric Schmidt (CEO of Google). See About New Ameri-
ca, NEw AM. FOUND., http://www.newamerica.netlabout (last visited May 22, 2011) (self-identifying
the New America Foundation as a "nonpartisan public policy institute" that emphasizes "big ideas,
impartial analysis, and pragmatic solutions"). At all odds, given the ideological charge of the CIA's
drone campaign, it is somewhat reassuring that two very different organizations arrived at almost iden-
tical figures.
76. Drew, supra note 6.
77. Id.
78. Mayer, supra note 5, at 38.
79. Cf id. (citing a statement of former counter terrorism official stating that the CIA has mul-
tiple drones flying over Pakistan and searching for targets at any given time).
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seven CIA officers in a suicide bombing in Khost, Afghanistan serves as
a stark reminder of how difficult this job can be."
Not all sources of information are, or will be regarded as equal. A
CIA analyst may trust sources that come from within his or her own serv-
ice more than sources from sister agencies such as the Air Force. As to
liaison sources, the CIA analyst may trust Afghan and Pakistani sources
less than British sources because of differences in tradecraft, motivations,
and reliability.
Information concerning the identity and expected locations of
AQ/T members enables the CIA to determine where to fly its drones.
Once a drone arrives at the location of a suspected target (or, more accu-
rately, thousands of feet above the target), there remains the crucial task
of confirming that the person in the cross hairs is, in fact, the person
whom the CIA wishes to kill. Human sources may play a role in con-
firming the target. As for technical sources, the National Security Agen-
cy provides information about targets by intercepting electronic commu-
nications and matching them to samples in the agency's databases."1 The
samples for Osama Bin Laden, for example, must be extensive. Other
technical means for gathering intelligence surely exist, but those who
know the most about this subject are not allowed to speak to the public.
Drones operate in a virtual space in which the vast resources of the
U.S. intelligence community are directed toward creating an accurate
picture of targets on the ground.Y Assuming that the CIA goes about the
drone program with the same diligence it applies to other intelligence
functions, the process for targeted killing demands, receives, and digests
a great deal of information from many sources. Some sources may be
open. Many others are secret.
As befits a bureaucratic organization, the CIA has put in place
standards and procedures for assessing and acting upon information rel-
evant to target selection and execution.83 The CIA is accustomed to
checking off the boxes in its paperwork. Mindful of their potential legal
exposure on targeted killing, CIA officials no doubt worked very closely
with their "inside" lawyers in the CIA's Office of General Counsel to de-
velop these standards and procedures, which, as bureaucratic logic dic-
80. See Joby Warrick & Peter Finn, Bomber of CIA Post Was Trusted Informant, WASH. POST,
Jan. 5, 2010, at Al (reporting that a trusted Jordanian operative whom the CIA thought was infiltrat-
ing Al Qaeda on the agency's behalf was in fact an Al Qaeda mole).
81. Mayer, supra note 5, at 38 (reporting that the NSA provides "signal intelligence" to the CIA
to confirm target identification).
82. Regarding drones as part of an integrated campaign to gather intelligence and kill targets,
former State Department and CIA official Henry Crumpton remarked:
You have to know where to put the bird to begin with .... It's a dynamic process.... Once you
have a strike, you have disruptions and you have more intelligence to collect. It's a wonderful
cycle that involves all-source collection and analysis, and the Predator is only part of it.
Peter Finn & Joby Warrick, Under Panetta, a More Aggressive CIA, WASH. POST, Mar. 21. 2010, at A8.
83. See Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK.COM (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://www.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html (interviewing former Acting
General Counsel of the CIA. John Rizzo, on the procedures governing CIA drone strikes).
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tates, apparently have the blessing of the "outside" lawyers of the De-
partment of Justice." Observers outside the government, including the
American Civil Liberties Union and the United Nations Special Rappor-
teur, have asked the CIA to reveal its standards and procedures for tar-
geted killing, as well as its legal justifications." The CIA, to no one's
surprise, has declined to do so.86 Why reveal anything about a program
that the CIA will neither confirm nor deny?
Not all agencies, though, are as secretive as the CIA. Harold H.
Koh, the current Legal Adviser to the State Department, offered the fol-
lowing assurances in remarks to the American Society of International
Law:
Our procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets are ex-
tremely robust, and advanced technologies have helped to make our
targeting even more precise. In my experience, the principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality that the United States applies are not
just recited at meeting [sic]. They are implemented rigorously
throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to en-
sure that such operations are conducted in accordance with all ap-
plicable law. 7
During the speech, Koh never mentioned the CIA by name. This is not
surprising because that part of the drone campaign, if any, is ostensibly a
secret. Nonetheless, Koh intended for his analysis to apply across all
government agencies. At least for the moment, the Obama administra-
tion's statement about standards and procedures boils down to a few
words-Trust us: We are good at target identification, and we try very
hard to do a good job. That is all there is to the official account.
Media accounts are a little more detailed than Koh. They state that
the White House has delegated trigger authority to the CIA." At the
CIA, lawyers draft "cables" based on available intelligence to justify tar-
geting an individual for "lethal operation." 9 Emphasizing intense con-
cern to ensure "legality," these cables include a signature line for the
CIA's general counsel." CIA Director Leon Panetta approves each
strike, "sometimes reversing his decision or reauthorizing a target if the
84. Id. (reporting an unnamed Obama administration official's claim that the CIA's drone
strikes "are conducted in strict accordance with American law and are governed by legal guidance
provided by the Department of Justice").
85. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, CLA. Deaths Prompt Surge in Drone War, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23,2010 (Late Edition), at A3 (reporting that the American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom
of Information Act request in January 2010 for "government documents revealing procedures for ap-
proving targets and legal justifications for killings").
86. Mayer, supra note 5, at 37 ("[The CIA] declines to provide any information to the public
about where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in charge, or how many people have been
killed.").
87. Press Release, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, supra note 15, at 3 (emphasis added).
88. Mayer, supra note 5, at 38.
89. See McKelvey, supra note 83 (discussing the role of CIA attorneys in targeting).
90. See id. (noting that targeting "cables" include a signature line for general counsel).
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situation on the ground changes." 91 During the Bush administration, in-
formed observers believed the director of the CIA had, in turn, dele-
gated trigger authority to the chief of the Counterterrorist Center.9 So,
in a change under Obama, the decision to kill or not to kill comes from a
senior official subjected to Senate confirmation.
If the CIA has actually learned from the military's extensive expe-
rience, then one can infer a great deal more. The military's "Joint Tar-
geting Cycle" requires: (1) identification of the military objective of an
operation, (2) target development and prioritization, (3) capabilities
analysis (or choosing your weapon), (4) commander's decision and force
assignment, (5) mission planning and force execution, and (6) assess-
ment.93 The military, like the CIA, speaks in jargon.
Of particular note, target development includes both target "vet-
ting" and target "validation." Vetting requires a combatant command to
"engage the intelligence community (IC) and other organizations sub-
ject-matter experts (SMEs) to establish a reasonable level of confidence
in a candidate target's functional characterization based on a review of
the supporting intelligence."9 4 This culminates in a formal vote among
intelligence community subject-matter experts (IC SMEs) on the "validi-
ty of the target intelligence and any identified intelligence gain/loss con-
cerns."" An attack may go forward without unanimity among the IC
SMEs, but commanders are told to regard lack of consensus as "indica-
tions of evaluated operational and strategic risk."9 6 Presumably, the CIA
has some similar process in place for validating its targets-and if it does
not, it should.
Validation determines whether an attack on a target would comply
with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and any applicable Rules of
Engagement (ROE).97 In light of the complexity of applicable law, a
Staff Judge Advocate "must be immediately available and should be con-
sulted at all levels of command to provide advice about law of war com-
pliance during planning and execution of exercises and operations."98
Just like the military, the CIA has lawyers who can and should be con-
sulted on target validation.
91. Finn & Warrick, supra note 82.
92. See Dana Priest, Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005
(Final Edition), at Al ("[A]ccording to half a dozen former intelligence officials, [CIA Director Tenet]
delegated most of the decision making on lethal action to the CIA's Counterterrorist Center."); see
also Mayer, supra note 5, at 38 (reporting delegation to "C.I.A. officials, including the head of the
Counter-Terrorist Center").
93. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-60, JoINT TARGETING 11-3 (2007), http://www.bits.de/
NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_60(07).pdf.
94. Id. at 11-7.
95. Id. at app. D-6.
96. Id. at app. D-7.
97. Id.
98. Id. at app. E-6.
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For the military, collateral damage estimation (CDE) is part of the
validation process, but also extends through target execution." The mili-
tary conducts CDEs according to a process laid out in a classified docu-
ment.'" (The CIA is not the only U.S. agency that keeps secrets.)
Where collateral damage may be expected to exceed "established na-
tional-level notification thresholds," a classified sensitive target approval
and review process applies, which requires reference to the secretary of
defense or the president.o"
The joint targeting process also requires continuous assessment de-
signed "to measure progress of the joint force toward mission accom-
plishment."102 At the "combat assessment" level, this process requires
assessing all available sources of the "battle damage" caused by a
strike.103 These sources include anything that might be able to record
video of the strike: drones, aircraft, or weapons systems.'" They also in-
clude any available human sources, open sources, and signals intelli-
gence.05 In short, the goal is to collect all information reasonably availa-
ble to determine if a strike did what it was supposed to do.
The press has revealed other details about the military's procedures
for targeting persons in Afghanistan. The names of these targets appear
on the Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List, which, as of August 2009,
had 367 names on it."6 No person is supposed to become a target until
his or her enemy status is confirmed by "two verifiable human sources"
and "substantial additional evidence."" Some targets may be killed on
sight; some require additional authorization.00 Also, a target's location
near a school, hospital, or mosque weighs against carrying out an at-
tack. "
The CIA, in fashioning its own standards and procedures, has pre-
sumably relied on the military."0 Whatever these standards and proce-
dures may be, they are not capable of perfection. Both the CIA and the
military are pursuing enemies that do not wear uniforms and that embed
99. Id. at II-10.
100. Id. at 11-10, app. G-1 (noting the detailed CDE process contained within the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3160.01A, entitled Joint Methodology for Estimating Collateral
Damage and Casualties for Conventional Weapons: Precision, Unguided, and Cluster); see also U.S.
JOINT FORCES COMMAND, JOINT FIRES AND TARGETING HANDBOOK 111-77 (2007),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/jntfiretar-hdbk.pdf.
101. Id. at 11-10-11-11, app. G-2 (citing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM
3122.06B, entitled Sensitive Target Approval and Review (STAR) Process).
102. Id. at app. C-1.
103. See id. at app. C-4.
104. Id. at app. C-5.
105. Id.
106. James Risen, Drug Chieftains Tied to Taliban Are U.S. Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009
(Late Edition), at Al.
107. Mayer, supra note 5, at 43 (referencing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See McKelvey, supra note 83 (discussing the high degree of CIA-military cooperation for
drone strikes).
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themselves in the civilian population. No matter what the CIA or the
military does, mistakes are going to occur. Osama Bin Laden was a tall
man who wore robes; in February 2002, a Predator in Afghanistan killed
a tall man in robes who turned out to be a villager gathering scrap met-
al."' Even so, the impossibility of attaining perfection does not excuse
the CIA, the Air Force, or other agencies from doing their best to get
things right on targeted killings.
During the Obama administration, critics have complained that
drone strikes are killing far too many civilians. 112 Using the language of
IHL, they question whether strikes are proportional. Of course, com-
plaints about collateral damage are not unique to the CIA's drone cam-
paign, and they are not limited to the CIA's role in pulling triggers. For
example, during an armed conflict about a decade ago, the Air Force in
1999 bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade based on faulty intelli-
gence from-none other than-the CIA.113
Assessments of collateral damage from CIA drone strikes vary wild-
ly. At the high end of assessments about civilian damage, Professor
Mary Ellen O'Connell contends that the strikes are killing about fifty ci-
vilians for every intended target."4 If this remarkable figure is true, then
the CIA's use of armed drones amounts to a serious war crime.
O'Connell's sources, however, seem more circumspect. For instance,
O'Connell relies on counterinsurgency experts David Kilcullen and An-
drew Exum, who write:
Press reports suggest that over the last three years drone
strikes have killed about 14 terrorist leaders. But, according to
Pakistani sources, they have also killed some 700 civilians. This is
50 civilians for every militant killed, a hit rate of 2 percent-hardly
"precision." American officials vehemently dispute these figures,
and it is likely that more militants and fewer civilians have been
killed than is reported by the press in Pakistan."1
For further support, O'Connell cites Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiede-
mann of the New America Foundation to show that eighty-two drone
strikes have killed 750 to 1000 people of whom a mere twenty were lead-
111. John F. Bums, A Nation Challenged: The Manhunt; U.S. Leapt Before Looking, Angry Vil-
lagers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17,2002 (Sunday Edition), at 18.
112. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 14, at 7, 9-10 (discussing the inaccuracy of drone attacks and
claiming a very high rate of collateral damage).
113. See generally George Tenet, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency, DCI Statement on the Belgrade
Chinese Embassy Bombing, Address Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Open Hearing (July 22, 1999), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
testimony/1999/dcmspeech 072299.html ("[A] series of errors led to the unintended bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.").
114. See O'Connell, supra note 14, at 1 (arguing that, by October 2009, drones had killed an esti-
mated ratio of about 20 leaders to 750-1000 unintended victims).
115. David Kilcullen & Andrew McDonald Exum, Death from Above, Outrage down Below, N.Y.
TIMES, May 17, 2009 (Sunday Edition), at 13 (emphasis added).
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ers of AQ/T."6 Bergen and Tiedemann, however, have concluded that
the overall civilian fatality rate for CIA drone strikes in Pakistan since
2004 has been thirty-two percent and that this figure declined to twenty-
four percent during 2009 and to six percent during 2010.17 They there-
fore see great progress in reducing collateral damage. Government offi-
cials go further, claiming that drone strikes have killed about twenty
"enemy fighters" for every peaceful civilian."' Depending on the source,
the kill ratio of illegitimate to legitimate targets is anywhere from 50:1 to
1:20.
The thousand-fold gulf that separates these figures can be attributed
in part to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data from Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Further complicating matters, persons who are hostile to the
United States have an obvious motive to exaggerate civilian deaths and
injury; U.S. officials have a contrary motive to minimize them. In any
case, much of the disparity stems from the difficulty of categorizing
deaths near a targeted AQ/T leader. O'Connell makes the categorical
assumption that these people are civilians and thus collateral damage."'
More realistically, Bergen and Tiedemann say "reliable press accounts"
show that about two-thirds of those killed were "militants."12 0 The gov-
ernment's extremely low figures on collateral damage might be based on
sound intelligence concerning the target's companions, or these figures
might be tainted by the government's obvious interest in justifying its
conduct. Until the veil of secrecy is pulled back on targeted killing,
common sense suggests that the truth is somewhere between O'Connell's
figure, which is unjustifiably high, and official figures, which Pay be in-
fluenced by some wishful thinking.
There is also widespread disagreement about the military efficacy of
drone strikes. Officials claim that drones have killed off much of Al
Qaeda's senior leadership.12' Killing leadership must, to some extent,
116. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 1 n.6 (citing Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Revenge of
the Drones: An Analysis of Drone Strikes in Pakistan, NEW AM. FOuND. (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/revenge-ofthe.drones).
117. See Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 75, at 2, 3 tbl.2 (reporting figures through early 2010
based on analysis of media sources with "deep reporting capabilities" in Pakistan); see also O'Connell,
supra note 14, at 1 (concluding that drone strikes in Pakistan in 2010 killed between 80 and 140 mili-
tants).
118. See Shane, supra note 1 (reporting a claim of an anonymous government official that "80
missile attacks from drones in less than two years have killed 'more than 400' enemy fighters," but had
killed "just over 20" civilians, all of whom were "either at the side of major terrorists or were at facili-
ties used by terrorists"); see also Roggio & Mayer, supra note 75 (estimating that "only 9.5 percent of
the casualties reported [from CIA drone strikes in Pakistan] have been identified as civilians," but
conceding that this estimate is rough and undoubtedly low).
119. O'Connell, supra note 14, at 2 n.6 ("[T]he most accurate way to characterize the persons
killed as a result of U.S. drone attacks is to refer to the list of persons the U.S. intended to kill and the
numbers of those who the U.S. did not intend to kill.").
120. See Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 75, at 1, 3.
121. Mayer, supra note 5, at 40 ("Counterterrorism officials credit drones with having killed more
than a dozen senior Al Qaeda leaders and their allies in the past year, eliminating more than half of
the C.I.A.'s twenty most wanted 'high value' targets.").
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disrupt planning both by eliminating the people who make the plans and
by discouraging others from taking their places.122 A New York Times
reporter who survived harrowing captivity by the Taliban reported that
his captors lived in constant fear of drone strikes. 12 3 Obsessive about
their safety, militants "communicate only with elaborate secrecy and ...
leave their squalid hideouts only at night." 124 While the agency's official
position is neither to confirm nor deny a CIA role in targeted killing,
CIA Director Leon Panetta described the drone campaign as "the only
game in town" against Al Qaeda.125
Critics of the CIA's targeted killing, contrary to Panetta, say the
program does more harm than good to U.S. interests. Kilcullen and Ex-
um, for instance, concede that killing terrorists, viewed in a vacuum,
creates positive military effects.126 But they also contend that the overall
costs outweigh their benefits because: (1) drone strikes create a counter-
productive "siege mentality" among the local populace of Northwest
Pakistan, solidifying extremists in that area; (2) they cause public outrage
across Pakistan; and (3) the drones, deployed without a sound under-
standing of their effects, substitute a "piece of technology" for strategy. 127
Assessing the Kilcullen and Exum critique is not a mathematical
exercise-rather, it requires nuanced political and military judgments
based on incomplete, uncertain facts. Still, the U.S. military's own poli-
cies demonstrate that it agrees with critics that controlling collateral
damage and maintaining local support are crucial. In this regard, the ob-
jectives of law and policy overlap. The U.S. Army's Counterinsurgency
Manual advises that "[p]olitical power is the central issue in insurgencies
and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its
governance or authority as legitimate."" It adds, "[an operation that
kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to re-
cruitment of fifty more insurgents."129 For this reason, the U.S. military
122. To put the disruptions of the drone strikes into some perspective, consider that, according to
Juan Zarate, a Bush counterterrorism adviser, there are only about fifty members of Al Qaeda's sen-
ior leadership. Id. at 42. If Zarate is correct, and if the CIA has not exaggerated its success, then
drones have killed about a quarter of Al Qaeda's senior leadership over the past year. See id. at 41.
123. David Rohde, Held by the Taliban: A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
21, 2009 (Late Edition), at Al ("[F]or months the drones had been a terrifying presence.... We knew
we could be immolated without warning.... The strikes ... created a paranoia among the Taliban.
They believed that a network of local informants guided the missiles. Innocent civilians were rounded
up, accused of working as American spies and then executed.").
124. Mayer, supra note 5, at 42.
125. Id. at 40.
126. Kilcullen & Exum, supra note 115, at 13.
127. Id.
128. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-3 (2006),
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf.
129. Id. at 1-41.
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has applied extremely restrictive rules of engagement in Afghanistan to
bring down civilian casualties.1 0
To summarize this Part: if this Article's assumptions are correct, the
CIA's use of armed drones in Pakistan combines a marvelous new weap-
on with an intense intelligence effort to find and kill leaders of AQ/T.
Not much is publicly known about the standards and the procedures the
CIA uses for its strikes. For reasons of policy and law, we hope these
standards and procedures draw heavily from the military's policies on
targeting since the military naturally hews to IHL. While the Obama
administration says very little about targeted killing, there is widespread
disagreement about the CIA's success in minimizing collateral damage
and in achieving military objectives.
IV. CONTROLLING THE CIA's DRONES
The CIA must have detailed standards and procedures for identify-
ing its targets and for carrying out its drone strikes. But the agency has
not seen fit to share these standards and procedures to those without se-
curity clearances and a "need to know." As the CIA's actual standards
and procedures cannot be critiqued, this Article focuses on what these
standards and procedures should be to comply with IHL. This leads to
two primary claims.
First, the agency should impose a very high standard in identifying
targets. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the agency may strike
only if satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that its target is a combatant-
member of AQ/T. Those who believe that this reasonable doubt stand-
ard carries too much baggage from criminal law or that it inappropriately
mixes criminal justice with war should substitute some other label for a
very high level of certainty. This alternative label could be clear and
convincing evidence or some other similar formulation. The idea, how-
ever labeled, is for the drone operator to be really sure before pulling the
trigger on a lethal missile. Drone strikes, after all, are executions without
any appeals in the courts.
Second, as part of a system to ensure the interrelated goals of accu-
racy, legality, and accountability, all CIA targeted killings should be sub-
ject to independent review by the CIA's Inspector General that is as pub-
lic as national security permits.13'
130. See Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, in 85
INT'L L. STUD., THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 307, 315-17 (Michael N. Schmitt ed.,
2009) (discussing the U.S. military's restrictive ROEs in Afghanistan).
131. In an earlier piece, we explained how a requirement of independent executive review could
be derived from the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, which we argued should apply to tar-
geted killing abroad of noncitizens under Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). See Murphy &
Radsan, supra note 14, at 429-37, 445-50. Recognizing that not every reader will be persuaded by our
due-process argument, we derive in this piece a requirement of independent executive review from
IHL's requirement of precaution.
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A. Certainty and Distinction
Imagine two U.S. fighters: a Marine on the ground in the Helmand
Province of Afghanistan and a drone pilot thousands of miles away in the
United States. These two Americans, soldier and pilot, are both on the
watch for bad guys, for Taliban and Al Qaeda forces arrayed against
them. The two Americans try their best to follow the rules-which in-
clude IHL and any ROEs produced back at the Pentagon and the CIA.
In particular, both strive to honor the principle of distinction, killing only
legitimate targets.
They must, of course, apply this principle of distinction in very dif-
ferent circumstances. The soldier on the ground must often make
lightning-fast decisions based on inadequate information. The practice
of the Taliban and Al Oaeda of hiding among peaceful civilians makes it
quite difficult for U.S. fighters to determine who is a legal target-
especially when many civilians carry weapons for protection against
thieves, bandits, and insurgents.'32 In Helmand Province, what does the
Marine do about a man walking down the street with an AK-47? "When
in doubt," one not-so-imaginary Marine said about this situation, "empty
the magazine."' This response is wrong as a matter of law, but it high-
lights sentiments and circumstances that must be considered in any real-
istic assessment of the soldier's legal obligations in a very dangerous situ-
ation.
A drone pilot, armed with the latest technology, the best intelli-
gence, and many miles from the enemy, must be more circumspect. The
pilot's instructions to kill come through an intense intelligence effort and
deliberative process.13 4 Once the drone is in location, the pilot and a
team of analysts may be able to spend hours studying the ground to con-
firm the target's identity. If the target is having dinner with his wife,
children, and extended family, the pilot is able to hover overhead and
wait until the target "drives back to work" before firing the missile. Pre-
cise technology, consistent with distinction, gets the job done and saves
everyone else back at the dinner party.
Because the solider and the pilot operate in different circumstances,
the law should not expect them to apply the principle of distinction in the
same way. When the pilot operates with the most advanced technology
and from a safe distance, the law should demand greater certainty from
132. See Schmitt, supra note 130, at 313 ("Enemy forces wore no uniforms or other distinctive
clothing that allowed immediate visual identification. Merely being armed was an insufficient indica-
tor, as Afghans in remote areas often carry weapons for protection...."). See also Richard D. Rosen,
Targeting Enemy Forces in the War on Terror: Preserving Civilian Immunity, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 683, 751 (2009) (discussing the practice of insurgent and terrorist groups blending into civilian popu-
lations to take advantage of civilian immunity from direct attack).
133. Email from [name withheld by request], Retired Sergeant. U.S. Marine Corps, to Christo-
pher Proczko, student, William Mitchell Coll. of Law (Sept. 22, 2009, 09:47 CST) (on file with author).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 (noting that drone attacks are the product of a
complex system of intelligence gathering).
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the pilot than from the soldier on the ground."' Because precise tech-
nology increases the CIA's ability to control its force, IHL imposes a cor-
responding duty to do So.13 6 Still, no matter how precise the technology,
requiring perfection is quixotic because every weapon is only as good as
the intelligence guiding it-and humans are imperfect.
In a general way, IHL does demand more from the drone pilot. Ar-
ticle 50(1) of Additional Protocol I declares that "[i]n case of doubt
whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a
civilian.""' The ICRC's commentary on Protocol II for nonintemational
conflicts maintains this presumption as well."'3  At one level, this pre-
sumption of civilian status is a noncontroversial matter of common sense.
An attacker should conclude a target is proper under IHL before pulling
the trigger. Yet this presumption does not generally require an attacker
to resolve all legitimate doubts in favor of civilian status."' For the sol-
dier taking fire in the field, the level of certainty required by distinction
must, to some degree, take into account the soldier's dangerous situation
and the range and quality of information available to him.
The ICRC, not known for a cramped view of IHL protections for
civilians, acknowledged this realism in a guidance document issued after
a discussion among IHL experts.'o This guidance on distinction says:
Obviously, the standard of doubt applicable to targeting decisions
cannot be compared to the strict standard of doubt applicable in
criminal proceedings but rather must reflect the level of certainty
that can reasonably be achieved in the circumstances. In practice,
this determination will have to take into account, inter alia, [(1)] the
intelligence available to the decision maker, [(2)] the urgency of the
situation, and [(3)] the harm likely to result to the operating forces
or [(4)] to persons and objects protected against direct attack from
an erroneous decision.141
135. Cf Schmitt, supra note 74, at 455 ("[T]hose with advanced [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] will have a much more difficult time convincing others that an attack striking civilians
and civilian objects was a case of mistaken identity rather than an indiscriminate act of recklessness (or
intent).").
136. Dakota S. Rudesill, Note, Precision War and Responsibility: Transformational Military Tech-
nology and the Duty of Care Under the Laws of War, 32 YALE. J. INT'L L. 517,532 (2007).
137. Protocol I, supra note 42, art. 50(1).
138. See Junod, supra note 57, § 4789 ("[I]n case of doubt regarding the status of an individual, he
is presumed to be a civilian.").
139. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 130, at 320 ("Obviously, [Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I
does not rule out doubt altogether.").
140. Melzer, supra note 61, at 992 (explaining that Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law was the result of several years of
examination by "legal experts" of the concept of direct participation in hostilities).
141. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added); see also Matthew C. Waxman, Detention As Targeting: Stan-
dards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1389 (2008)
("While it is impossible to pin down a precise formula for calculating reasonableness, factors such as
time constraints, risks, technology, and resource costs emerge over time as key considerations in the
legal analysis.").
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The ICRC thus acknowledges that the level of acceptable doubt is
based on all relevant circumstances.142 How could the ICRC have
reached any other conclusion that applies across the entire range of situ-
ations within armed conflict? Vagueness and abstraction are the costs of
offering guidance on distinction capable of covering actions by either the
soldier on the ground or the drone pilot in a remote facility.
Applied to the generic facts of drone strikes, the ICRC guidance on
distinction calls for a higher level of certainty in targeting from the drone
pilot than from the soldier on the ground. After all, drone operators
should generally have better intelligence available, and no one is shoot-
ing at them. But just telling the drone pilot that he or she must be more
careful with his or her missiles than the soldier must be with his or her
gun is not enough. A more precise instruction is necessary: targeted kill-
ing by a drone may go forward only where it is clear to a high degree of
certainty that the target is legitimate under the facts and the law. As ap-
plied to the CIA's campaign, this instruction says the drone operator (or
whoever else gives the order to kill) must be sure, before firing a missile,
that the target is a combataut member of AQ/T who plans, commands, or
carries out attacks. 143 The intelligence, at a high level of certainty, must
support placing the target into this legal category. And, to do all this, the
commander probably needs legal advice from inside or outside the
agency.
Fortunately for us (and most fortunately for those who are potential
false positives of drone strikes), a high level of certainty in pulling the
trigger seems consistent with the United States's official stance. In his
public defense of drone attacks, Harold Koh remarked:
In U.S. operations against [A]l Qaeda and its associated forces-
including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned
aerial vehicles-great care is taken to adhere to these principles [of
distinction and proportionality] in both planning and execution, to
ensure that only legitimate objectives are targeted and that collat-
eral damage is kept to a minimum."
Strictly speaking, Koh's remark did not address the level of certainty re-
quired for targeted killing by CIA drones. Yet he tried his best to reas-
sure a skeptical audience that the CIA and military forces are quite con-
fident of their facts before they fire missiles on U.S. enemies.
142. Id. at 316 (quoting unclassified summary of rules of engagement for Operation Iraqi Free-
dom that stated that "PID [positive identification of the enemy] is a reasonable certainty that the pro-
posed target is a legitimate military target"); see also Schmitt, supra note 130, at 319 ("States have
tended to mandate the only level of certainty that is practicable in the fog of war-would a reasonable
warfighter in the same circum-stances hesitate to act?"); Waxman, supra note 141, at 1391 (observing
that IHL should not impose too strict a standard for target identification-namely beyond reasonable
doubt-because to do so "would expose an attacking party to unacceptable risks and delays, and
would mean refraining from many attacks where such verification is impractical").
143. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63 (explaining that persons functioning as combatant
members of AQ/T are legitimate objects of attack under IHL).
144. Press Release, Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, supra note 15, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Our proposal that CIA drone strikes require a high level of certain-
ty in targeting may, at first blush, seem contrary to IHL's generous rule
that targeting be reasonable based on the totality of known circum-
stances.145 Viewed from the correct angle, however, our proposal is just
an application of IHL's rule of reason to the generic facts of drone
strikes at premeditated targets. Factored into the equation are the mul-
tiple sources of intelligence, the time for deliberations, and the relative
safety of the drone pilot. Absent exceptional circumstances, a reasona-
ble commander should demand-and thus IHL should demand-a very
high level of certainty before striking.
To help justify our claim, recall that the core purpose of IHL is to
minimize suffering while allowing legitimate military objectives to be
achieved in an armed conflict.14 In light of this purpose, the principle of
military necessity condemns an attack if it will cause suffering not rea-
sonably necessary to achieve a concrete and direct military advantage.147
In combat, one can gain a military advantage either by protecting one's
forces or by degrading opposing forces; in simple terms, it is good to
keep the enemy from shooting at you, and it is good to wear the enemy
down. For targeted killing by drone, however, immediate force protec-
tion is largely irrelevant because the air vessels are unmanned (which is
not to say that the drones themselves are valueless-just that they are
not people). Therefore, broadly speaking, targeted killing by this new
weapon satisfies military necessity only if it causes sufficient military
harm to the enemy.
On a case-by-case basis, one might question whether killing any
enemy combatant creates a military advantage. In a large conflict with
thousands of fighters, the effect of killing one fighter might be de mini-
mis, and opposing forces could easily find someone to fill the shoes of
anyone killed. Ever practical, IHL does not generally require an individ-
ualized analysis of military effects of killing a particular combatant.
Rather, IHL takes as given (or at least strongly presumes) that killing an
enemy combatant (who is not hors de combat) degrades opposing forces
enough to justify killing that combatant.'*
As to U.S. targeted killing, the CIA is said to be decapitating
AQ/T's leadership, and independent reports confirm that the drone
145. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (explaining that IHL contemplates that com-
batants will make judgments concerning positive identification of enemy forces based on reasonable
assessment of the totality of the circumstances).
146. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (identifying humanitarian aims of IHL).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67 (discussing the concept of "military necessity").
148. See MELZER, supra note 14, at 288 (noting that many "powerful States and authors appear to
believe" that IHL authorizes the killing of enemy combatants at any time and any place provided they
are not hors de combat; contending, to the contrary, that there is, at most, a "strong presumption" that
attacking enemy combatants who are not hors de combat satisfies the requirement of military necessi-
ty, but that this presumption should not hold where enemy combatants can be taken by nonlethal
means without additional risk).
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strikes have hampered terrorist activities. 149 These tangible effects help
demonstrate that drone strikes satisfy IHL's requirement of military ne-
cessity so long as they are carefully limited to people who are AQ/T
combatant members.
These effects do not, however, necessarily justify drone attacks
where the identities of targets are less than certain. Allowing action
based on a lesser standard of certainty decreases false negatives and in-
creases false positives. In more concrete terms, allowing the CIA to kill
based on a lesser standard means killing more bad guys, but also killing
more good guys. The key question under IHL is whether killing off the
latter group to enable killing off the former group is justified-as a mat-
ter of both military necessity and proportionality.
If other considerations are ignored, it is easy to conclude that the
United States is better off killing more AQ/T combatant members. Each
kill causes some damage to AQ/T, degrading operations and demoraliz-
ing members. The incremental benefits from each strike, however, are
very difficult to measure. If government assurances are true that the
procedures are "extremely robust" and "rigorous,"5 0 then targets that
are highest on the CIA's list should be able to satisfy very strict require-
ments of distinction and target identification. These strikes should dis-
rupt AQ/T operations by killing leaders, by making members fear the
skies, and by creating anxiety that there are informants within AQ/T
ranks helping call in the strikes. Yet, as with most things in nature, the
law of diminishing returns might apply to additional attacks against less-
certain and less-important targets: killing the fiftieth most important tar-
get will probably cause much less disruption than the twentieth. As the
strikes move down the AQ/T "organizational charts," the targets pre-
sumably become less certain and more replaceable. While there was on-
ly one Osama Bin Laden, the eleventh-in-command can probably replace
the tenth-in-command.
An obvious disadvantage of applying a laxer level of certainty to
CIA targeting is a greater number of possible deaths and injuries to
peaceful civilians. This is a self-evident humanitarian harm that enters
the calculations of proportionality. Moreover, these deaths (or the per-
ception of unnecessary deaths) will affect the political and military situa-
tion on the ground in Afghanistan or Pakistan, changing the calculations
of military necessity. Again, the U.S. military insists that winning over
the local population is vital to counterinsurgency, 5' and, to this end, the
Pentagon has attempted to minimize civilian casualties in Afghanistan
149. See supra text accompanying notes 121-125 (discussing damage caused to AQff by CIA
drone strikes).
150. See supra text accompanying note 87 (quoting State Department Legal Adviser Harold H.
Koh's public remarks defending drone strikes).
151. See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, supra note 128, at 1-3 ("Political power is the central issue in in-
surgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or au-
thority as legitimate.").
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through strict ROE.5 2 Local politics, in this way, may loop back into an
application of IHL. The strict ROE for Afghanistan may become more
than just cautious policy.
The expected military utility of killing an AQ/T combatant member
must be balanced against the expected military disutility of killing a
peaceful civilian. Military necessity will justify an attack only where the
net gain amounts to a concrete and direct military advantage. (The net
gain is also relevant to assessing proportionality, because the smaller the
gain from a drone strike, the less collateral damage can be justified.) In
keeping with counterinsurgency's stress on winning "hearts and minds,"
generally speaking, one cannot say with any certainty that the net ex-
pected utility of a strike that runs a substantial risk of targeting an "inno-
cent" person will amount to a concrete and direct military advantage.
So, in general, drone strikes should involve a high level of certainty in
targeting (i.e., distinction) to satisfy military necessity.
In keeping with IHL's flexible, fact-sensitive approach, our rule of
heightened certainty may not apply in truly exceptional circumstances.
For example, the target may play an irreplaceable role in AQ/T. Osama
Bin Laden, to name one person, was beyond doubt a legitimate target; he
was probably number one on the CIA's target list-and on the Defense
Department's list. At some point, a drone operator might have seen on
the screen a person who, based on all available information, was proba-
bly Osama Bin Laden-but not Osama Bin Laden beyond any doubt.
The military advantage of killing Osama Bin Laden, compared to a mid-
level AQ/T member, would have justified the additional risk of mistak-
enly harming a peaceful civilian. Targeting the person at the top, it turns
out, does not have to be as certain. Yet the relevant agency (whether the
CIA or the Air Force) should bear the burden of justifying any departure
from the default rule of heightened certainty in targeting. Part of the
government's burden should be to explain why trying to kill the head of
Al Qaeda today justifies the risk of killing another "tall man" hunting for
scrap metal.'
B. Precaution and Independent, Ex Post Review
As to "precaution," IHL insists that attackers take all feasible
measures to ensure that they attack only legitimate targets, that they
minimize collateral damage, and that they avoid excessive collateral
damage.'" As discussed, the U.S. military takes great efforts to satisfy its
duty of precaution; extensive, written instructions relate to validating and
152. Schmitt, supra note 130, at 315-17.
153. See supra text accompanying note 111 (recounting how the CIA killed a tall man in robes
because the agency thought he might be Osama Bin Laden).
154. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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vetting targets, to executing attacks, and to assessing their effects.'s Pre-
sumably, the CIA takes its duty of precaution no less seriously.
Notwithstanding the agency's reputation for playing fast and loose
with the law, CIA officials have strong reasons to ensure compliance with
IHL. One reason is that someday the CIA's targeted killings by drone,
like other embarrassing "family jewels," will become public. 6 A strong-
er reason is that CIA officials must be acutely aware that, for many
members of the United States and international public, targeted killings
come close to prohibited acts of assassination. To stay on the safe side
on controversial programs, CIA officials seek both political and legal
cover.' From past lessons on other covert actions, CIA officials have
learned to obtain presidential authorization in writing, to brief the over-
sight committees, and to obtain legal opinions. It is safe to bet that Pres-
ident Obama has blessed the CIA drone strikes; that the oversight com-
mittees have not been kept completely in the dark; that the CIA has
developed internal procedures on targeted killing it hopes will withstand
scrutiny; and that the agency has presented these procedures to the Jus-
tice Department's Office of Legal Counsel for approval.'
Because the concept of precaution is so vague, the procedures to
fulfill this duty might reasonably take many forms. Moreover, those pro-
cedures should depend in large part on detailed studies from the field. If
experience from the classified setting shows that particular procedures
result in too much collateral damage, then the CIA must adopt stricter
procedures. This is the sort of feedback loop the Defense Department is
accustomed to in its "after-action" studies from prior bombing cam-
paigns. The CIA must do the same.
The duty of precaution requires the CIA, in general, to adopt pro-
cedures reasonably expected to improve accuracy and to curb abuse
without excessive military or humanitarian costs. It is a delicate balance.
As part of this balance, the CIA's targeted killing should be subject to as
much independent, public, ex post review as national security reasonably
permits.
Whatever the CIA's standards and procedures, they can do little
good unless they are enforced. Long experience teaches that standards
and procedures are much more likely to be enforced when the decision
155. See supra text accompanying notes 93-109 (summarizing the U.S. military requirements on
targeting).
156. A Glimpse into the CIA's 'Family Jewels,' N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/world/americas/26iht-cia.5.6349602.html (discussing the release of
CIA documents detailing assassination plots and secret testing of LSD on unwitting subjects).
157. Cf Scott Shane, In Legal Cases, C.I.A. Workers Turn to Insurance Firm in Virginia, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008 (Sunday Edition), at 31 (discussing a niche insurer that pays legal bills of federal
officials for investigations and litigation relating to their work, and observing that business has thrived
since September 11, 2001).
158. Cf Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos Spell out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at Al (citing President Obama's assurance that CIA officers "who were acting
on the Justice Department's legal advice would not be prosecuted" for abuse of detainees).
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maker must explain his or her decision to an independent authority at a
later time. This is the basic interest in accountability. For CIA drone
strikes, the interest in accountability is acute given the veil of secrecy
over CIA activities and the specter that targeted killing could become
distorted into arbitrary acts of murder. At the same time, the CIA has an
interest in protecting the sources and methods of intelligence for national
security. The question, in reconciling democracy with secrecy, becomes
what model of accountability best balances these interests.
Answering that question for the CIA requires a leap from the usual
IHL model of accountability. The military model is distinct for several
reasons: (1) a traditional armed conflict may require hundreds or thou-
sands of people to make decisions-often under stress, fatigue, and dan-
ger-regarding whether to kill people or to destroy property; (2) many of
these decisions are straightforward under the principles of distinction
and proportionality because the enemy is easy to identify (e.g., it is ob-
viously legal for a soldier to shoot at an enemy tank with no civilians near
it); (3) much of the information needed to second-guess these decisions is
covered in the rubble of war; and (4) the self-evident boundaries to the
conflict allay concerns that supposed combatants will be killed anywhere
in the world in the name of national security.
For traditional armed conflicts, it is not realistic or desirable for au-
thorities to invest significant resources into ex post investigation of the
legality of every decision made. Too many things occur on the battle-
field. Outside IHL, this is also true in civilian life: prosecutors do not fol-
low us around to check on the legality of every decision we make. In-
stead, in both the military and civilian settings, the relevant authorities
usually wait until they have grounds for believing a serious violation has
occurred. Once they have these grounds, they investigate, and those in-
vestigations can lead to civil, administrative, or criminal penalties
through some form of adjudication.
The CIA's drone campaign, to repeat, differs from traditional
armed conflict. First, as long as the number of strikes stays below some
manageable figure (e.g., in the low hundreds per year), it is practicable to
subject every strike to an independent investigation. Second, all strikes
are intended to have lethal consequences by definition, and the danger
from a misfired missile is much higher than the danger from a misfired
pistol. Third, the information needed to evaluate these strikes stays
available. The images from the drone's camera are recorded. The intel-
ligence for selecting the target is contained in cables and other docu-
ments. The communications between the drone operator and the other
decision makers are also recorded. All of this information can enable
meaningful ex post review.
Fourth, and most important, because the CIA is given more leeway
than the military to operate in the shadows, a countervailing check is
needed. Even if the Obama administration carries out targeted killing
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accurately and wisely in the moment, the potential for abuse is frighten-
ing. How many countries are within the killing field? How many more
countries are to come? Will Predator strikes ever be used on U.S. terri-
tory? As a check against abuses, IHL requires feasible precautions.'
While ensuring that drone missiles do not kill innocent civilians today,
these precautions should also protect civilians tomorrow. No matter
which agency is pulling the trigger, strong and careful controls are
needed on the government's power to kill "enemies of the state."
Scrutiny of the CIA can take many forms. Some might be too weak
to do any good; others might be so strong as to unduly expose intelli-
gence sources and methods or to cause decision makers to become undu-
ly risk averse. Once again, we confront the Goldilocks problem of select-
ing a model that is "just right" for balancing competing concerns.
The Israeli Supreme Court's analysis of targeted killing provides a
useful starting point for this model.160 Recall that the Court concluded
that Palestinians engaged in terrorist activities could be targeted as civil-
ians directly participating in hostilities.16 ' To solve the revolving-door
problem, the Court declared a definition of direct participation in hostili-
ties that allows targeting of persons who plan or command attacks.'62
This broad definition, however, tends to increase the risk to peaceful ci-
vilians. For balance, the Court developed limits on targeted killing
through a mix of IHL and human rights law. These limits include: (1) in-
dependent, ex post investigation by executive authorities "regarding the
precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the
attack," and, even more remarkable from a U.S. perspective; (2) inde-
pendent judicial review of those executive investigations. 6
As legal authority for independent intraexecutive review, the Court
relied in part on precedents from the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) governing the use of force in counterterrorism operations."*
Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms declares that "[e]veryone's right to
life shall be protected by law," but it adds that a killing does not violate
this right if it results from the "use of force which is no more than abso-
lutely necessary ... in defense of any person from unlawful violence
159. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
160. See generally HCJ 769/02, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. (PCA TI) [Dec.
11, 2005], slip op.
161. Id. at para. 61 (concluding that preventative strikes (i.e., targeted killings) are legal under
some circumstances).
162. Id. at para. 37 (declaring that deciding upon or planning terrorist acts amounts to direct par-
ticipation in hostilities).
163. Id. at para. 40 (requiring objective, ex post executive review); id. at para. 54 (requiring judi-
cial review of ex post executive review in "appropriate cases").
164. Id. at para. 40 (citing, inter alia, McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, paras.
161-63 (1995)); McKerr v. United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553,559 (2001).
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. .. ."165 To give effect to this right, the ECHR insists that "there should
be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have
been killed as a result of the use of force by ... agents of the State," to
determine whether the deadly force was justified and to punish those re-
sponsible if it was not.'" The persons who conduct the investigation must
be "independent from those implicated in the events."167  Moreover,
there must be "a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation
or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory."16
In essence, the Israeli Supreme Court took this requirement of executive
review from the human rights context, in which it was developed, and
transplanted it to IHL.169
The Israeli Supreme Court, to ensure objectivity, added that judicial
review of the ex post executive review should be allowed "in the appro-
priate cases."' Parts of the opinion suggest a strict, de novo review to
ensure judicial control over the interpretation and the application of
IHL.1'7 Thus, it is for Israeli courts, not executive authorities, to deter-
mine what the principles of "distinction" and "proportionality" require.172
In the same breath, the Court recognized that these principles must leave
room for discretion by military officials based on facts available at the
time the force was used.7 1
Overall, the Supreme Court of a small country quite vulnerable to
terrorism in the Middle East does not fear that special scrutiny of tar-
geted killing will result in an unbearable risk to its national security. So,
if Israel can create and manage a system of accountability for targeted
killing, then, on a similar balance, the United States should be able to do
so as well.
Who in the United States should conduct this review of targeted
killing? And what should the scope of review be? Taking the second
question first, the Israeli Supreme Court is correct that ex post review
must defer to some extent to reasonable military judgment and-when
we travel to the U.S. context-to reasonable intelligence functions. In
the United States or Israel, the reviewing entity should not substitute its
judgment for the reasonable judgment of officials who decide whether to
165. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2,
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
166. See, e.g., McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, para. 161.
167. McKerr, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, para. 112.
168. Id. at para. 115.
169. See PCA TI at para. 40.
170. Id. at para. 54.
171. Id. at para. 56 ("The question which the Court must ask itself is not whether the executive
branch's understanding of the law is a reasonable understanding; the question which the Court must
ask itself is whether it is the correct understanding.").
172. Id. at paras. 8, 23, 58.
173. Id at para. 57 ("The question is whether the decision of the military commander falls within
the zone of reasonable activity on the part of the military commander."); id. at para. 58 ("A zone of
proportionality is created. It is the borders of that zone that the Court guards. The decision within the
borders is the executive branch's decision.").
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strike or not. Rather, the reviewing entity should police against abuses
and clearly unreasonable judgments. It is review, after all, not micro-
management.
To flesh out the scope of this review, U.S. administrative law is also
useful. In particular, the doctrine of "reasoned decision making" (also
known as "hard look" review) provides a template for reviewing CIA
drone strikes. Using this template, a court examines whether an agency
made its decision based on all "relevant factors" or whether the agency
has made a "clear error of judgment."'74 Relevant factors are those the
law instructs the agency to consider in making a certain decision. For in-
stance, Congress has instructed the Environmental Protection Agency, in
setting a national ambient air quality standard, to consider what limits on
pollutants are "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate
margin of safety."'7  The agency should therefore set limits based on
health and safety, not on the irrelevant factor of the profitability of the
coal industry.176
Review for reasoned decision making is supposed to examine what
an agency actually considered in making its decision."' To do that, the
court looks to the contemporaneous explanation an agency gave for its
action. 7  By this technique, courts prevent agencies from using post-hoc
rationalizations for decisions reached on less defensible grounds.
For CIA drone strikes, this "hard look" is an especially good fit for
review of target selection-i.e., identification of particular persons for
targeted killing. To select a particular person as a target, the agency
must seek and assess all available intelligence. This assessment should be
memorialized in exhaustive findings that assess all relevant factors. Un-
der our interpretation of IHL, those factors include: (1) all grounds for
concluding the target is a combatant member of AQ/T; (2) any grounds
for doubting this status; (3) whether killing the target creates a concrete
and direct military advantage; (4) whether that advantage is sufficient to
justify any risk of collateral damage, and, if any, how much; and (5) any
military or political disadvantages that might result from a strike against
the target.
Hard-look review presupposes that an agency has the time and the
resources for careful deliberation before it acts. Even though a drone
174. For a seminal case discussing this point, see, for example, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
176. Cf Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-65, 471 n.4 (2001) (observing that a
national ambient air quality standard should be vacated as illegal if Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) based it upon the cost of attaining compliance, which the Clean Air Act forbade EPA from
considering in determining acceptable pollutant levels).
177. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("The grounds upon which an administra-
tive order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was based.").
178. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 50 (rejecting explanation proffered by agency
counsel during appellate proceedings because the record indicated that the agency had not relied upon
that explanation in making its decision).
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can hover over a target for many hours, this form of review does not fit
firing decisions; that is not the time for operators to be drafting findings.
A drone operator can, however, prepare an exhaustive after-action re-
port minutes or hours later. Those reports would include, at minimum,
video feeds, audio traffic, electronic mail, and telephone logs. Reports
would explain: (1) the grounds for concluding that the strike was, in fact,
directed at the preselected target; and (2) grounds for concluding that
any expected collateral damage was acceptable.
In sum, a variation on hard-look review could promote accountabili-
ty by having the agency memorialize its decision making on drone strikes
and exposing it to scrutiny. At the same time, this review would in-
corporate a deferential standard of clear error that respects the CIA's
split-second judgments in conducting attacks.
Determining an appropriate scope of review still leaves open who
should conduct that review of CIA drone strikes. The Israelis rely on a
mix of executive and judicial actors. In the United States, federal judges
have great independence because of lifetime tenure and protections of
their salaries. They are obvious candidates. But using federal courts to
review CIA targeted killing raises a host of problems. Few judges are
military and intelligence experts, and the transparency of civilian courts
goes against the secrecy necessary for some military and intelligence op-
erations. As a compromise, one might try a national security court to
keep intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.7 9
But, putting aside academic debates, Congress does not seem interested
in a new court. Another problem with regular courts is the "standing"
requirement of a plaintiff who is ready and able to bring suit. The targets
of attacks, even if they survive, are unlikely to travel from Afghanistan or
Pakistan to file suit, and it is not clear who else could be a proper plain-
tiff.180
There are other candidates to conduct independent review. Execu-
tive officials, to be sure, are not as independent as federal judges. These
officials have a natural impulse to avoid embarrassing the administration
they work for. Moreover, if the media are correct that CIA Director
Leon Panetta approves drone strikes,"s' then this review goes toward the
most senior officials in the intelligence community. Despite these chal-
lenges, there is at least one official with a measure of independence for
meaningful review of CIA drone strikes.
179. Cf Amos N. Guiora, Where Are Terrorists to Be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights
Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REv. 805, 834-35 (2007) (recommending amendment
of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to allow prosecution of terrorists before FISA courts,
thereby ensuring civilian control while respecting security).
180. For an argument that a proper plaintiff, in theory, could bring a Bivens action to challenge
targeted killing-coupled with a recognition that the practical force of this theoretical point is van-
ishingly small-see Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 437-45.
181. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting press reports that Panetta approves drone
strikes).
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The CIA's Inspector General (IG) is charged with investigating the
legality of CIA actions. 18 2 He or she is experienced with protecting classi-
fied information. His or her independence is protected by a statute that
permits only the president to remove the IG.'83 And he or she has a dual
reporting line to the CIA Director and to the congressional oversight
committees.8" The CIA's IG is thus our preferred candidate.
The CIA's IG should review all the CIA's targeted killings for rea-
soned decision making. Based on this review, an IG could recommend
internal discipline, compensation to unwarranted victims of a strike, or,
in an extreme case of abuse, referral to the Department of Justice for
criminal proceedings. The IG should also be involved in reviewing the
CIA's internal procedures on target selection and execution of attacks.
IG's due process, so to speak, substitutes for what otherwise might come
from the courts. To enhance accountability, the IG could prepare public
reports detailing as much information on strikes as reasonably consonant
with national security. Such reports would need to balance the interests
of accountability against the CIA's need to enable foreign governments
to keep their role in assisting U.S. intelligence a secret. They would also
need to avoid excessive revelations of sensitive sources and methods.
Given the limited number of CIA strikes, the dangers this program
poses to peaceful civilians now and in the future, and the extensive data
concerning each strike, it is feasible for the IG to conduct an investiga-
tion of all CIA drone strikes. These investigations will not guarantee
perfection. Nothing can. But they will help ensure the accuracy and the
legality of strikes, curb abuses, and provide a modicum of accountability
for a shadow war. Because they are feasible under the laws of war, IHL
requires them.
V. ONE PROCESS FOR ALL
Americans expect their government to kill terrorists who cannot be
captured and are members of groups willing (and demonstrably able) to
kill thousands of civilians. That is the reality for the age of terror. No
matter what olive branches we may offer, some parts of Al Qaeda will
continue to seek the United States' destruction. Even so, the govern-
ment's power to kill must be carefully controlled-or it could turn into a
tyranny worse than terrorism.
The traditional control of judicial trial does not work for targeted
killing; only the fanciful would propose a full judicial trial in which the
government and the suspected terrorist make opening statements, admit
evidence, and argue the suspect's fate to the jury. In the dawning age of
182. See generally 50 U.S.C. § 403q (2006).
183. Id. at § 403q(b)(6).
184. Ryan M. Check & Afsheen John Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA's In-
spector General, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 247, 268 (2010).
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the drone, a new model must be developed that recognizes that fighting
terrorism can be as much war as it is law enforcement. The new model
can come from hybrid principles of due process, IHL, or from other
sources. Whatever the source, appropriate models will increase the
probability that targeted killings are directed only against members of
extremely dangerous groups that cannot be countered in other ways.
Given the nature of the terrorist threat, it is not obvious why the cit-
izenship of suspected terrorists should strongly affect the model for con-
trolling targeted killing. Along these lines, it bears noting that IHL does
not consider citizenship in distinguishing combatants from civilians. In
traditional conflicts, the United States has had citizens switch to the oth-
er side. Switched, they become targets just like foreign combatants. In a
nontraditional conflict, a U.S.-citizen terrorist may be just as likely to
travel to and from the United States as a Pakistani citizen.
Nonetheless, news that the Obama administration placed at least
one U.S. citizen on the hit list caused outrage in some quarters.' This
outrage seems to stem from a mistaken intuition and a flawed legal ob-
jection.
The intuition is that there is something especially wrong about the
U.S. government killing Americans. True, people tend to treat members
of their own groups better than outsiders. To put someone in prison or
to kill him, the labels "defendant" or "outsider" often help. Yet, at a
higher morality, the U.S. government should not feel, independent of
other factors, freer to kill any of the six billion non-Americans in the
world than any of the three hundred million Americans. The flip side,
morally speaking, is that the U.S. government has just as much standing
to kill Americans as non-Americans.
The legal objection is that killing an American by drone strike vi-
olates the target's right to due process under the U.S. Constitution. 86
This due process objection rests on the premise that targeted killings at-
tempted outside the United States by the U.S. government implicate due
process only if the target is a U.S. citizen. We have argued in an earlier
piece that the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v. Bush suggests
185. See, e.g., Drones, Targeted Killings and the Fifth Amendment, ACLU BLOG RIGHTS (Feb. 4,
2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/drones-targeted-killings-and-fifth-amend
ment [hereinafter Drones] (describing as "downright scary" that the Director of National Intelligence
"admitted that the Obama administration reserves the right to order the assassination of Americans
abroad who are suspected of involvement in terrorism"); Glenn Greenwald, Presidential Assassina-
tions of U.S. Citizens, SALON (Jan. 27, 2010, 6:28 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/
glenn-greenwald/2010/01/27/yemen ("Barack Obama, like George Bush before him, has claimed the
authority to order American citizens murdered .. .. ").
186. See, e.g., Drones, supra note 185 (characterizing drone strikes on U.S. citizens as "assassina-
tion," "death-before-due-process," "extrajudicial killing," and a violation of the Fifth Amendment
right to due process); Greenwald, supra note 26 (decrying that U.S. targets are entitled to no charges,
no trial, no ability to contest the accusations).
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that this premise is mistaken." In that case, the Supreme Court applied
a multifactor test to determine that the constitutional protections of ha-
beas corpus reach outside the United States to nonresident aliens de-
tained at Guantanamo.xas One of the factors in the Court's inquiry was
indeed citizenship-i.e., the non-U.S. citizenship of the detainees
weighed against having habeas corpus reach to them. 89 The Court none-
theless ruled in favor of the detainees in light of other factors:
(1) the ... status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's en-
titlement to the writ.190
Regarding these other factors, the Boumediene Court noted: (1) the de-
tainees contested their status as enemy combatants, which suggested a
potential need for further process; (2) the United States exercised total
control over Guantanamo; and (3) the government failed to present a
credible argument that extending habeas corpus to the detainees would
compromise the military mission. 9' In light of these functional factors,
the Court concluded that constitutional habeas corpus extended to the
detainees notwithstanding their non-United States citizenship.192
Boumediene's logic thus suggests that the U.S. Constitution should
apply overseas to noncitizens where it is practicable and reasonable for it
to do so.193 Its functional approach should determine not only how ha-
beas travels abroad but how due process travels. Of course it would be
wildly impracticable to give a terrorist a full judicial trial before a tar-
geted killing is attempted. Thus, if one were to contend that due process
always requires a full trial before deadly force is used, then one could
apply Boumediene's functionalist approach to conclude that due process
does not apply to targeted killings of noncitizens outside the United
States.
Due process, however, does not always require a judicial trial.
Rather, at bottom, the right to due process is the right to fair and reason-
able procedures.194 And how can it be impracticable and unreasonable
for the CIA or any other U.S. agency to apply internal checks and guide-
187. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 433-37 (contending that, properly understood,
Boumediene v. Bush subjects the U.S. government to due process restrictions wherever it acts in the
world).
188. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,766-71 (2008).
189. Id. at 766-67, 770-71.
190. Id. at 766.
191. Id. at 766-69.
192. Id. at 770-71.
193. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 434-36 (discussing the Boumediene majority's func-
tionalist approach to the availability of habeas corpus review for detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
194. See, e.g., Gary Lawson et al., "Oh Lord, Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood!": Rediscov-
ering the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 14 (2005)
(concluding, based on an extensive survey of centuries of case law, that the touchstone of procedural
due process is "a search for what procedures are fair under the circumstances of each particular case").
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lines to targeted killing? Boumediene therefore suggests that the U.S.
government, as a matter of due process, has a constitutional obligation to
apply fair and reasonable procedures when it engages in targeted killing
of people abroad-whatever their citizenship.'
The question thus transforms from whether due process applies at
all in the targeted killing of suspected terrorists to what process is due.
In considering the transformed question, it bears stressing that due
process is not an all-or-nothing proposition. It is famously fact sensitive,
developing different models for different contexts."' There is a due
process of prisons,'" a due process for discipline in schools,"' and a due
process for detaining U.S. citizens in the war on terror.1' All these mod-
els strive for procedures that ensure fairness and accuracy while recog-
nizing that the government must carry out its duties.
Our country must now develop a due process for targeted killing by
drone. As we do so, we should not be surprised to see a convergence be-
tween the due process model and the IHL model. The IHL requirement
of precaution, in particular, is closely related to due process insofar as it
requires combatants to adopt all feasible measures to ensure that targets
are proper objects of attack.20
Also, as we develop this model, we should avoid discriminating in
favor of Americans. If the internal checks and guidelines on targeted
killing are not good enough for killing Americans, then we should not
use them for killing Pakistanis. No matter the citizenship of the target,
the controls on armed drones should take all feasible steps to ensure that
strikes are accurate and warranted. Due process and IHL both demand
as much.
VI. CONCLUSION
International humanitarian law can be developed into specific regu-
lations for the CIA's targeted killing of active members of Al Qaeda and
the Taliban. To honor the IHL principles of distinction and military ne-
195. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 14, at 437 ("[Tihe executive branch has an obligation to
use fair and reasonable procedures to control how it goes about depriving people of life, liberty, or
property anywhere in the world.").
196. See Lawson et al., supra note 194, at 9-15 (explaining that the courts have developed differ-
ent procedural models to govern different types of deprivations).
197. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (holding that liberty interests protected within
prison are "generally limited to freedom from restraint ... [that] imposes atypical and significant hard-
ship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life").
198. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (holding that due process required "at least an in-
formal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian" in connection with a short suspension of a
student from public school).
199. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that detainee
had a right to notice and a fair opportunity to rebut enemy combatant status before a neutral de-
cision maker, and intimating that the government might invoke a rebuttable presumption in favor of
its evidence and might also use hearsay).
200. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing the IHL concept of "precaution").
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cessity, CIA officers must be sure, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a tar-
get is legitimate before authorizing or pulling the trigger on a drone
strike. In addition, to honor the IHL principle of precaution, the CIA's
Inspector General, with sufficient independence, must review every CIA
drone strike, including the agency's compliance with a checklist of stand-
ards and procedures for the drone program.
A program that establishes a high level of certainty for targeting, as
well as a hard-look review after each strike, should help ensure fairness
and accuracy regardless of whether the people in the crosshairs are
Americans or citizens from other countries.. In today's language of IHL,
these are feasible precautions for the remote-control weapons of the new
century.
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